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NOTE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN LATE
IMPERIAL, MODERN, AND POST-
TIANANMEN CHINA
Alan W. Lepp*
When he reached the big hall, the old man with the clean-shaven head was
still sitting there as usual, and Ah Q also knelt down as usual. Very gently
the old man questioned him: "Have you anything more to say?" Ah Q
thought, and decided there was nothing to say, so he answered, "Nothing."
A number of men in long coats and shortjackets put a white vest offoreign
cloth on him. It had some black characters on it. Ah Qfelt considerably
disconcerted, because this was very like mourning dress, and to wear
mourning was unlucky. At the same time his hands were bound behind
his back, and he was dragged out of the yamen. Ah Q was lifted on to an
uncovered cart, and several men in short jackets sat down with him. The
cart started off at once. In front were a number of soldiers and mili-
tiamen shouldering foreign rifles, and on both sides were crowds of gaping
spectators, while what was behind Ah Q could not see. Suddenly it oc-
curred to him- "Can I be going to have my head cut off?"...
Naturally all agreed that Ah Q had been a bad man, the proof being that
he had been shotfor if he had not been bad, how could he have been shot?
But the consensus of opinion in town was unfavorable. Most people were
dissatisfied, because a shooting was not such a fine spectacle as a
decapitation.
- Lu Xun, "The True Story of Ah Q"'I
INTRODUCTION
In this classic tale written in 1921, the great satirist Lu Xun had
recognized a Chinese capacity to tolerate the arbitrary exercise of state
power over the criminal process. In the story, Lu Xun described how
the self-deceiving and boastful Ah Q was finally shot in 1911 before a
captivated crowd for proclaiming himself a revolutionary, when actu-
* University of Michigan Law School, Class of 1990. Special thanks to Professor Michel
Oksenberg, Marc Lambert, and Michael Winter for their helpful suggestions and encouragement.
I. Lu HSUN [Lu Xun], SELECTED STORIES OF Lu HSUN 110, 112 (1978). Fiction, while
perhaps just an idealized version of reality, nevertheless can offer penetrating glimpses of individ-
ual thought and informal group activities. The portrayal of local leaders and events in short
stories can probe various dimensions of society in a way unmatched by the press, travelogs or
other sources. See Oksenberg, Sources and Methodological Problems in the Study of Contempo-
rary China, in CHINESE COMMUNIST POLICIES IN ACTION 602-03 (A.D. Barnett ed. 1969). See
also, LIN YO-SHENG, THE CRISIS OF CHINESE CONSCIOUSNESS 125 (1979) ("[T]he general fea-
tures of the Chinese people are embodied in the particular behavior and the distinctive personali-
ties of Ah Q and the people around him in such a manner that they have become an integral part
of the twentieth-century Chinese imagination.").
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ally he was nothing more than a braggart and petty thief. Deeply dis-
turbed by the effects of mob behavior and abuse of power, Lu Xun
sought to express in his writings the cruel and heartless side of China's
"'ancient spiritual civilization."' 2
The persistent recurrence of death sentences and executions
throughout various regimes in late imperial and modem China cannot
be explained away as merely historical coincidence. The state's meting
out of severe punishment to control society and serve its needs has
been a constant theme throughout Chinese history. The imperial dy-
nasties dating back to the Tang,3 for instance, each had codified well
over one hundred crimes legally punishable by death.4 During the
twentieth century, the Nationalists and the Chinese Communists had
passed numerous laws imposing the death penalty. 5 Even in the post-
Mao era, the Criminal Law adopted on July 1, 1979, listed seven ordi-
nary offenses and fourteen counterrevolutionary offenses punishable
by death. 6 Since 1981, new legislation has applied the death penalty to
twenty-three more offenses.
7
While China's criminal justice process over the past two centuries
should not be characterized as static or monolithic,8 the criminal pro-
cess has nevertheless demonstrated a longstanding pattern of using ex-
ecution to serve its goals and purposes. This ancient tradition's most
2. Lu Xun presented his bleak prognosis of Chinese behavior in a letter to a friend in 1925:
"When the Chinese are confronted with power, they dare not resist, but use the words 'taking the
middle course' to put a good face on their real behavior so that they feel consoled. If they have
power and realize that others cannot interfere with them, or they are supported by the 'majority,'
most of them are cruel, heartless, and tyrannical, just like despots; they then do not take the
middle course." LIN YO-SHENG, supra note 1, at 128-29.
3. A.D. 619-906.
4. Shen Jia-ben compiled the number of capital offenses for each of these dynasties: Tang
Code of 653 - 223 crimes; Sung Code of 963 - 293 crimes; Yuan Code of 1277 - 135 crimes; Ming
Code of 1397 - 282 crimes; Qing Code of 1740 - 813 crimes. These statistics are reprinted in D.
BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 102-04 (1967) [hereinafter D. BODDE & C.
MORRIS].
5. See, e.g., THE PROVISIONAL CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Peking 1923)
[hereinafter 1923 PROVISIONAL CRIMINAL CODE]; Statute on Punishment for Counterrevolu-
tionary Activity (approved Feb. 20, 1951), trans. in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF
COMMUNIST CHINA (A. Blaustein ed. 1962).
6. The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated July 1, 1979) [hereinaf-
ter Criminal Law], trans. in THE CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF
CHINA (Beijing 1984) [hereinafter CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW]; the
Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated July 1, 1979) [hereinaf-
ter Criminal Procedure Law], trans. in CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW.
7. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS - PRISONERS
OF CONSCIENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 57 (1984)
(hereinafter AI-1984].
8. See Alford, Of Arsenic and Old Laws.- Looking Anew at Criminal Justice in Late Imperial
China, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1180, 1190-92 (1984) (pointing out that prevailing Western images of
"the entire late imperial state as an authoritarian monolith essentially uninterested in law" are
being chipped away by recent studies in Chinese legal history).
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recent episode - the spate of executions following the Tiananmen
Square massacre on June 4, 1989 - reaffirms the Chinese leadership's
acceptance of the death penalty as both a form of criminal punishment
and a tool of the state to preserve its power.9 Despite the dramatic
transformations China has undergone during the past two centuries,
the death penalty remains deeply embedded in the Chinese notion of
justice.
This paper seeks to explore the crucial determinants that shape the
Chinese legal system's use of the death penalty. Why have the Chinese
relied so heavily on execution as a form of sentencing? What factors
and conditions account for the major changes in the frequency of
China's use of the death penalty? What indigenous traditions are re-
flected in China's implementation of the death penalty? In order to
inquire into the role and function of the legal system in affecting the
severity of criminal punishment in China, this study will focus on only
those death sentences carried out by the state in a judicial context.
Part I of this paper examines how China's different regimes have
used law and punishment as tools of the state to enhance its power and
shape people's behavior. Part II reviews the external pressures threat-
ening the stability of Chinese leadership that have also influenced both
the frequency and the harshness of Chinese criminal sentencing.
Throughout this paper, the term "external" is used to describe these
exogenous pressures, either domestic or foreign, that arise out of state
leadership, yet still shape its decision-making process. Part III then
examines the Chinese use of the death penalty through the policy justi-
fications of deterrence and retribution. Part IV seeks finally to identify
the indigenous traditions of the death penalty in China and examines
the persisting emphasis on hierarchy, the role of elite privilege, and the
concept of amnesty. A concluding section will assess the continuities
and changes demonstrated in the Chinese legal regime's handling of
the death penalty.
I. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
STATE CONTROL
State control, initiated by leaders at the apexi and implemented
through bureaucratic hierarchies, has long been essential to China's
effective functioning as a command-style political system. In no other
policy area has state control been as crucial to China's rulers as in the
9. At least forty executions and death sentences connected to the student protests during the
spring of 1989 have been officially announced. ASIA WATCH COMMITIrEE, PUNISHMENT SEA-
SON: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA AFTER MARTIAL LAW 7 (Feb. 7, 1990) [hereinafter PUNISH-
MENT SEASON].
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maintenance and preservation of social order. Social control has often
been most effectively exercised through the extensive use of the crimi-
nal justice system, including use of the death penalty as the surest
means of eliminating opposition and deterring others.
China's ruling elite historically has devoted considerable attention
to the role of law and legal institutions, and in particular, to the dis-
pensation of criminal punishment. Debate over the purposes of pun-
ishment actually dates back more than two thousand years to the
philosophical controversy between the humanist Confucian thinkers
and the more rationalistic exponents of Legalism.' 0 The Con-
fucianists, who believed in governance by moral example and virtuous
rule, asserted that the ultimate aim of government was to preserve so-
cial harmony. In contrast, the Legalists preferred a harsh system of
laws and punishments in subordinating all concerns to building up the
strength of the state. These concepts resonated strongly throughout
the imperial and Republican periods, and especially during the Com-
munist rule, despite the enormous change and upheaval in Chinese life
over the past forty years."I Among the most striking continuities has
been the steadfast belief of the ruling regime that the criminal process
should serve as an adjunct of state power. 12
The events surrounding Beijing Spring, 1989, confirmed that this
belief still prevails. The decision of the Deng Xiaoping leadership to
use armed force to quash the mass pro-democracy protests in
Tiananmen Square demonstrated the regime's unwillingness to toler-
ate such public defiance of national authority and control. The sum-
10. See B. SCHWARTZ, THE WORLD OF THOUGHT IN ANCIENT CHINA 321-49 (1985);
SOURCES OF CHINESE TRADITION 136-58 (de Bary, Chan, & Watson eds. 1960); see also S. VAN
DER SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANCHU CHINA 30-33 (1966).
11. Several landmark studies have sought to place the Chinese criminal process in historical
perspective. See, e.g., J. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 1949-1963 7 (1968) [hereinafter J. COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCESS] (In comparing the uses
of law in traditional China, the Republic of China, and the People's Republic of China, "one
major similarity stands out - law and legal institutions still serve principally as instruments for
enhancing the power of the state and for disciplining the people to carry out its policies.");
Lubman, Form and Function in the Chinese Criminal Process, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 537
(1969) ("My own interpretations differ from Cohen's... in stressing.., greater hesitancy to find
direct continuities between traditional and Communist Chinese legal institutions."); Li, Book
Review, 67 MICH. L. REV. 179, 195 (1968) [hereinafter Li, Book Review] (Review of D. BODDE
& C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA (1967) and J. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1963 (1968)),("A significant proportion of the ideas and
institutions that exist in the People's Republic of China today is a direct or indirect product of
the old system."); Li, The Role of Law in Communist China, 44 CHINA Q. 66, 73-74 (1970)
(arguing that the internal model of law relying upon persuasion and education to mold people's
behavior includes many traditional Chinese ideas as well as Communist Chinese ideology).
12. But see Alford, supra note 8, at 1242 (questioning the view that "the imperial criminal
justice process was little more than a vehicle for the consolidation of state control by the district
magistrate").
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mary executions of participants in the aftermath of the bloody
crackdown indicated that once again the state would use the criminal
law to consolidate its control and discipline the people to carry out its
policies. When viewed alongside other anti-crime campaigns of recent
years, 13 the executions following Tiananmen represent yet another of
the periodic attempts by the Communist leadership to use law as an
instrument of control to serve the interests of the state.
A. Late Imperial China
The Qing dynasty 14 is a useful period with which to begin a review
of China's traditional use of the death penalty. Not only have its insti-
tutions been regarded as the culmination of the Chinese imperial sys-
tem, but also it marks a time when Westerners first made substantial
contact with China. Prior to the Qing, successive dynasties enacted
their own penal statutes and amended them from time to time, yet the
general format and many individual statutes were adopted almost en-
tirely from earlier codes. The section headings of the Ming 15 and Qing
penal codes, for example, remained essentially unchanged from those
of the Tang dynasty.
16
The substantive law of the comprehensive Qing code served as an
instrument for enforcing Confucian-based social norms and for shap-
ing the behavior of the people to suit the aims of the authoritarian
government. The Qing state viewed the legal system, along with mo-
rality, custom, and education, as necessary for the preservation of the
social order. Thus, the harshest punishments were reserved for those
crimes that were regarded as threatening the continued existence of
society. Matters of greatest concern to the state included family af-
fairs, crimes of violence, and crimes against the state. The severity of
punishment, often carried out publicly, sought to ensure that the pop-
ulation would give absolute obedience and allegiance to the emperor.
The modes of punishment during the Qing Dynasty for cases of disloy-
alty included strangulation, decapitation, and death by slow slicing;
17
the last two were believed to deprive the offenders of any chance of
salvation in the next world. The punishments for offenses against state
13. See, e.g., People's Republic of China: Preliminary Findings on Killings of Unarmed Civil-
ians, Arbitrary Arrests and Summary Executions Since June 3, 1989, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
(Aug., 1989) [hereinafter AI-1989]; China. Torture and Ill-Treatment of Prisoners, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL (Sept., 1987); AI-1984, supra note 7.
14. 1644-1911.
15. The Ming dynasty ruled China from 1368-1644.
16. See I THE T'ANG CODE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 8-9 (W. Johnson 1979) (describing the
Tang Code's great influence on later Chinese criminal legislation).
17. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
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power - desertion, rebellion, and subversion - were not only far
more severe than those for any other crime in China, but also much
more serious than those for similar offenses in other legal systems.
18
For conduct not specifically covered by any existing statute, the Qing
code allowed prescriptions to be applied by analogy. 19 This method
further extended the reach of the substantive criminal law by allowing
the magistrate to raise or lower the statute's penalty in accordance
with the circumstances.
The criminal justice process also served the state's needs by rein-
forcing the dominant moral values. The penal emphasis in codified
law and the symbolic importance attributed to harsh punishments re-
flected the Chinese view that any lapse from moral perfection was a
threat to society.20 These laws were premised on widely-shared beliefs
about what was just, fair, and acceptable to the Chinese populace.
2'
This paternalistic strain, with its emphasis on the emperor, and its
popular concepts regarding the political order, justice, morality, and
the place of the individual in society, permeated the traditional Chi-
nese legal practice. 22 Even the magistrate, as the imperial officer clos-
est to the people, was called thefu-mu guan, "the father and mother
official." The magistrate, in turn, was expected to behave properly in
accordance with the prevailing standards and his obligations.
The perception that the criminal process served as a tool of the
state is further reinforced by the position of the district magistrate,
who as the representative of the imperial government performed a va-
riety of administrative functions ranging from tax collection and main-
tenance of public order to the investigation, prosecution, and
adjudication of criminal matters. 23 This aggregation of authority in
18. These three offenses also extended punishment to the wrongdoers' relatives in order to
impose a maximal penalty proportionate to the injury to the state. Given an individual's deep
sense of familial obligation, the ultimate penalty was to deprive the dead of family progeny. See
Ch'en, Disloyalty to the State in Late Imperial China in STATE AND LAW IN EAST ASIA 159, 169,
182 (D. Eikemeier & H. Franke eds. 1981).
19. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 32.
20. See S. VAN DER SPRENKEL, supra note 10, at 124-30 (describing the correlation between
sources of law and preservation of the social order during the Qing dynasty).
21. Cohen, Due Process? in THE CHINA DIFFERENCE 239, 257 (R. Terrill ed. 1972).
22. Sybille Van der Sprenkel traces this juxtaposition of morality and punishments to the
sources of law in late imperial China:
[T]he ultimate source of law is traceable to the belief shared by all sections of society - or
at least never openly challenged - that there was an overriding obligation to preserve the
harmony of the universe, under pain of evil consequences for all, if the natural order were
disturbed. It was this belief and this fear that led Emperor, officials and people to accept
theoretically the necessity for the enforcement of morality, administrative requirements and
legal custom.
S. VAN DER SPRENKEL, supra note 10, at 127.
23. Serving as judges of the court of first instance, district magistrates conducted investiga-
tions of criminal cases, issued warrants for arrest, examined suspects and witnesses, decided the
[Vol. I11:987
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one man carried great implications for the potential use and abuse of
state power.24 The district magistrate's office, or yamen, represented
the lowest administrative level where government law directly con-
fronted the population of the empire. The yamen served as the court
of first instance for the hearing of lawsuits, the point where the official
law impinged vertically from the state down to the individual, rather
than on a horizontal plane directly between individuals. Despite this
impressive display of state power in the hands of one man, some ad-
ministrative checks as well as practical considerations limited the exer-
cise of magisterial discretion.
25
The use of the criminal process as an instrument of state control
was also reflected in a highly centralized judicial procedure. Magis-
trates were guided by a detailed set of rules and laws prescribing an
inquisitorial mode of adjudication that lacked a developed concept of
"rights" for the accused as a limitation upon state power.26 The form
of the trial procedure gave the appearance that the defendant was pre-
sumed guilty even before the case was heard.27 Magistrates often
made full use of legal provisions that authorized torture in order to
extract a confession from the accused. 28 The defendant was denied
legal counsel and precluded from presenting his own witnesses.
29
B. The Republican Period 
30
Following the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911, a republican
cases and sentences according to the prescriptions of the penal laws and statutes, and oversaw
their executions. J. WATT, THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 12 (1972).
24. See S. VAN DER SPRENKEL, supra note 10, at 70 (arguing that the Qing legal system
provided no checks upon the exercise of power by the administrative officials such as magis-
trates); J. COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 6-7 (noting the inadequate institutional
safeguards available to a defendant in the magistrate's court of law).
25. See A. FEUERWERKER, STATE AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CHINA: THE
CH'ING EMPIRE IN ITS GLORY 66 (1976) (The magistrate's "responsibilities were all-encompass-
ing, but his omnipotence was only theoretical."); Alford, supra note 8, at 1193 (arguing that the
Qing possessed an elaborate system of checks operating from above that significantly restrained
magistrates exercising their authority in legal matters).
26. J. COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 7; Alford, supra note 8, at 1194.
27. See Gelatt, The People's Republic of China and the Presumption of Innocence, 73 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 259, 263-65 (1982) ("[T]he magistrate's approach seemed to have been to
presume guilt from the mere fact that the accused was before him.").
28. See T. C'HU, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE CH'ING 124-27 (1969) (not-
ing that legal forms of torture included flogging, slapping, squeezing fingers or ankles, or having
the suspect kneel upon an iron chain or pressing a stick against the back of the knees in cases of
robbery or homicide where he did not confess).
29. J. COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 6.
30. Unfortunately, the literature on the Republican era policies toward criminal justice and
the death penalty is scant and incomplete. Extra-judicial executions were certainly
commonplace, numbering in the tens of thousands in individual years alone. These deaths often
resulted from the arbitrary use of power by warlords or Guomindang troops.
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government was established that swept away China's traditional legal
system. The Provisional Criminal Code, drafted by a Law Revision
Commission created under the Qing, was promulgated in 1912. The
Code introduced some sweeping reforms, including the abolition of
forced confession, 31 analogical interpretations, and the most ruthless
forms of capital punishment, 32 including "death by a thousand cuts."
It also contained the proposition that a suspect was to be presumed
innocent unless proven otherwise.
33
The overarching aim of the Nationalist leadership that assumed
power under Chiang Kai-shek in 1927 was to unify a fragmented
country (controlled in part by warlords and then by Communists) into
a single modern state. Chiang recognized that in order for China to
become a first-class power, the rule of law would be necessary for
building a modern military, administrative, and industrial system.
34
After obtaining control of the Republic of China in 1927, Chiang's
Nationalist Party (Guomindang) framed modern legal codes of crimi-
nal law and procedure along the lines of the continental European
models. a5 Intending to modernize the existing judicial administra-
tion, the Nationalists sought to abandon the imperial practice of gov-
ernance that embraced a cosmic philosophy of law and left wide
discretion in the local enforcement of the law in the hands of magis-
trates. The Nationalists, in turn, attempted to impose tight national
control over the villages through the enlargement of the bureaucracy
at the xian level and the revival of the bao-jia neighborhood system of
police control. 36 They envisaged the establishment of a government
that based its rule of law on statutes, custom, and legal reason, rather
than personal whims or choices.
37
31. Tao, Reform of the Criminal Process in Nationalist China, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 747, 750
(1971).
32. M. MEIJER, INTRODUCTION OF MODERN CRIMINAL LAW IN CHINA 119 (1950).
33. Gelatt, supra note 27, at 266.
34. See J. COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 69. Cohen points out that Chiang's
notion of "respect for law" had more in common with the old Legalist conception of the function
of law rather than any Western type of liberalism. In his book CHINA'S DESTINY, for instance,
Chiang's principle association with "rule of law" was the notion of law as a means to increase the
power of the state. Similarly, the rule of law reflected the notion of sovereignty of the people.
Since the state derived its sovereignty from the people, the law was an expression of the people's
will.
35. J. COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 7.
36. Eastman, Nationalist China during the Nanking Decade, in 13 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
CHINA 147 (J. Fairbank & A. Feuerwerker eds. 1986) ("[Chiang Kai-shek] was a would-be total-
itarian, aspiring to extend the controls of his regime down to the local level, and to subordinate
the individual and all of society to the regime to a degree that emperors of the [Qing] dynasty had
not even dreamed of.").
37. See J. Wu, The Legal Systems of Old and New China. A Comparison, in THE ART OF
LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS JURIDICAL AND LITERARY 57 (Shanghai 1936).
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Despite these high ideals, however, persisting wartime conditions
and arbitrary military justice obstructed the actual implementation
and enforcement of the new legislation. The regime responded to
political dissent with brutal repression, including midnight arrests,
methods of torture and mutilation, assassinations, and summary ex-
ecutions. 38 In those isolated instances where the modem laws were
actually carried out, the legislation still failed to supplant traditional
moral beliefs. 39 More commonly, bribery and blackmail fueled the
Republican judicial system, which served not only to accomodate the
wealthy and influential, but also to support the army in suppressing
any enemies of the state.4° Yet, the patchwork alliance of police,
army, and gangster forces proved unable to induce popular support for
the ruling regime, which never established sufficient central control to
administer an effective legal reformation or implement the rule of law.
C. The Early Chinese Communist Experience: 1927-1949
Even prior to officially founding the People's Republic of China in
1949, the Chinese Communists, like their Legalist and Nationalist
predecessors, saw law as a political tool with which to serve the inter-
ests of the state rather than the individual. In 1927, the Chinese "sovi-
ets" were first established in the South China countryside, where
peasant tribunals oversaw rapid "trials" of gentry and landlords fol-
lowed by immediate execution. Borrowing from the Soviet Stalinist
model of the state, the Communists viewed law mainly as an instru-
ment of domination and coercion. Law had value only to the extent
that it aided in the achievement of state objectives.4' It was to be used
for purposes of conformity, disciplining and molding the people to
meet state needs. To insure consistency between Communist ideology
and judicial actions, the Chinese Communists rejected an independent
judiciary in favor of political control over the courts. Local govern-
ments approved judicial personnel, and judicial committees composed
38. See, e.g., H. ISAACS, THE TRAGEDY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 272 (1951) (journal-
istic accounts of some of the most ruthless acts of violence).
39. This resistance to the the adoption of European legal forms was exemplified by the inher-
itance law, which Jean Escarra indicates was "in disagreement with the centuries-old tradition
for at least eighty out of every hundred of the population." The Chinese had clung to Confucian
mysticism for twenty five centuries, added Escarra, "and a stroke of the pen cannot destroy it."
See J. ESCARRA, CHINESE LAW 574-75 (G. Browne, trans. 1961).
40. Judges, for instance, were given medals and promotions for sentencing and authorizing
the execution of Communists and other subversives. See J. BRADY, JUSTICE AND POLITICS IN
PEOPLE'S CHINA: LEGAL ORDER OR CONTINUING REVOLUTION? 51-53 (1982).
41. The Commissar of Justice, Liang Botai, charged that Communist leaders who favored
stricter observance of legal formality "did not understand that law develops in accord with the
needs of the revolution, and whatever benefits the revolution is law." P. GRIFFIN, THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST TREATMENT OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES: 1924-1949, 139 (1976).
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of Party and government leaders reviewed important decisions.42 In
short, law was the political organ of state power.
D. The People's Republic of China
The post-1949 era followed the earlier pattern of using law as a
means to promote socialist revolution and the construction of a new
socialist state. The Communists implemented land reform in 1949-51
in order to destroy the former local elite's hold on power and wealth,
but the campaign soon spilled over into widespread violence and ter-
ror, which was often unchecked and overlooked by the higher authori-
ties. On paper, the Agrarian Reform Law was supposed to prohibit
the beating and killing of people, 43 but in practice, the government
imposed little discipline over the killing and even encouraged violent
class warfare in the villages."
A viable legal system was considered an important prerequisite for
a legitimate government and would serve to maintain public order and
enforce new policies. Having consolidated power, the Communists es-
tablished a system of formal law and justice modeled basically on So-
viet legal institutions, including the establishment of people's courts
and people's procuracies responsible for supervising the prosecution of
offenders. Although the Communists' newly promulgated Common
Program formally abolished the laws and institutions of Chiang's re-
gime, in fact, many Guomindang judicial and police organs, were re-
tained by the Communists with little change.45 These compromising
measures reflected the importance attached by the Communists to
strengthening the judicial system. 46
China's movement towards the creation of a formal legal system,
however, suffered a serious setback in 1957 when the Party increased
its own powers and authorized informal extrajudicial institutions to
impose sanctions. The Party began to supercede the courts in the task
of meting out punishment, which was carried out against opponents of
the regime swiftly and through informal procedures. The Party also
42. Id.
43. The Agrarian Reform Law of the PRC (June 28, 1950), art. 32, translated in K. CHAO,
AGRARIAN POLICIES OF MAINLAND CHINA: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY (1949-1956) 43 (1963).
44. A.D. BARNETT, CADRES, BUREAUCRACY, AND POLITICAL POWER IN COMMUNIST
CHINA 228 (1967) (It was the government's policy "to choose at least one landlord, and usually
several, in virtually every village, for public execution.").
45. Li, The Evolution and Development of the Chinese Legal System, in CHINA: MANAGE-
MENT OF A REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY (Lindbeck ed. 1971) ("In Peking, for example, the
[Guomindang] court system was retained virtually intact after Liberation, except that it was now
called the 'people's court.' ").
46. See S. LENG, JUSTICE IN COMMUNIST CHINA 45-63 (1967).
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brought the public security apparatus under firmer control following
its promulgation of several national regulations concerning political-
legal work.47 As judicial work increasingly assumed political forms,
law as an instrument of control fell under the jurisdiction of the
Party.
4 8
The Communist Party set goals far more ambitious than those of
either the imperial dynasties or the Nationalists. The Communists
sought for the first time in Chinese history to extend the authority of
the central government down to the local level and to control nearly
every aspect of human activity. In order to harness the energies of the
people so as to meet the demands of altering both the physical envi-
ronment and human nature itself, the Communists relied heavily on
the criminal justice process in subjecting the populace to increasingly
rigorous discipline.49 They intensified the Marxist theory of class
struggle, which sought to classify each case individually according to
its class nature. They also adopted the form of "mass line" leadership,
purporting to involve the masses in government and legal decision-
making. Finally, they accepted the need for ruthlessness in carrying
out the Party policy. Mao himself had likenend his rule to that of the
merciless first, unifying emperor Qin Shi-huang, but in the end, con-
cluded he was more oppressive and violent than the ancient emperor. 50
The increasing use of these doctrinaire and ideological policies rup-
tured during the anarchic period of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution (1966-76), when the Maoists repudiated their earlier reli-
ance on the organs of the formal legal system and launched a mass
purge of all those in Chinese society who opposed Chairman Mao
Zedong's policy and ideas. In their zeal to dismantle the "bourgeois"
law enforcement apparatus, the Maoists extended the targets of attack
47. Li, The Public Security Bureau and Political-Legal Work in Hui-yang, 1952-64, in THE
CITY IN COMMUNIST CHINA 51, 72 (J. Lewis ed. 1971) (examining the Party's involvement in
public security work in one Guangdong county).
48. See F. SCHURMANN, IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA 188 (1968)
("[T]he Party, in effect, has displaced the system of law as the third arm of the state.").
49. See J. COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 7-8.
50. Oksenberg, The Political Leader, in MAO TSE-TUNG IN THE SCALES OF HISTORY 70, 71
n.2 (D. Wilson ed. 1977). At one Party meeting in 1958, Mao sought to distinguish himself from
the first emperor of the Qin dynasty (221-206 B.C.):
What did [Qin Shi-huang] amount to? He only buried alive 460 scholars, while we buried
46,000. In our suppression of the counterrevolutionaries, did we not kill some counterrevo-
lutionary intellectuals?... You accuse us of acting like [Qin Shi-huang], but you are wrong;
we surpass him 100 times. You berate us for imitating [Qin Shi-huang] in enforcing dicta-
torship. We admit them all. What is regettable is that you did not say enough.
Mao, Speeches at the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress (May 8, 1958), reprinted in
MISCELLANY OF MAO TSE-TUNG THOUGHT (1949-1968) PART I, 98 (1974) [hereinafter
MISCELLANY].
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to include even members of the Communist Party who were thought
to be "following the capitalist road."
Rather than serve as a coercive restraint, law was to be
subordinated to revolutionary doctrine and serve as the key instru-
ment of social change. Mao unleashed his Red Guards - the students
of China's universities and middle schools - to spearhead the attack
on a broad range of "enemies," including most of the members of the
Party's Central Committee. Many Red Guards independently con-
ducted investigations of their political enemies, made arrests, adjudi-
cated cases, and imposed sanctions during mass meetings and
tribunals. Tens of thousands were cruelly persecuted as the formal
legal organs lost complete control over social order and the adminis-
tration of justice. 51 Mao purged many law enforcement personnel, in-
cluding the President of the Supreme People's Court, the Chief
Procurator, and the First Deputy Minister of Public Security. 52 Dur-
ing this period of ideological fervor and violent upheaval, former gen-
eral secretary of the Party Hu Yaobang would say that one hundred
million people had been either directly or indirectly rendered victims
of the decade-long lawlessness. 53
When normalcy was restored to the legal system by 1977, follow-
ing the death of Mao and the subsequent purge of Mao's wife and the
other members of the "Gang of Four,"154 the Party and the police had
resumed their dominant roles. The government cautiously moved to
reestablish the institutions that had comprised the judicial system in
the pre-1957 period. Announcements of criminal sentencing were
again determined according to Party policy, especially that of "dealing
leniently with those who confess and severely with those who resist."' 55
51. See generally A. THURSTON, ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE (1987) (using personal interviews
to examine how the political chaos of the Cultural Revolution affected the lives of individual
Chinese).
52. Liu Shaoqi, the principal political target of the Cultural Revolution, was stripped of his
position as Chairman of the People's Republic of China by the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party, in disregard of constitutional procedure. See S. LENG & H. CHIU, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA 18 (1985). Any criticism of Mao or his Defense Minister Lin Biao
was regarded as an "active counterrevolutionary deed" and would be severely punished. See
Some Regulations of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council Concerning the
Strengthening of Public Security Work in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (Jan. 13,
1967), in CCP DOCUMENTS OF THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION 1966-
1967, at 175-76 (1968).
53. THURSTON, supra note 51, at xvi.
54. The "Gang of Four" refers to Jiang Qing (Mao's widow), Yao Wenyuan, Wang
Hongwen, and Zhang Chunqiao, who were blamed for the overzealous acts of the 1966-76 Cul-
tural Revolution. They were arrested about a month after the death of Mao Zedong in Septem-
ber, 1976.
55. S. LENG & H. CHIU, supra note 52, at 19.
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E. The People's Republic After 1978
The passing of the Maoist era marked a turning point in the evolu-
tion of China's criminal justice system. The leadership under Deng
Xiaoping has attempted to implement law reform in order to advance
its commitment to the "four modernizations," as well as to prevent
any recurrence of the arbitrary treatment and lawlessness of the Cul-
tural Revolution. Since 1978, the government has toned down the
heavy emphasis on ideological elements such as the "mass line" and
class struggle, and identified development of the rule of law as an ur-
gent task of modernization. 6
In a sense, the attempts of the Dengist leadership at legal moderni-
zation recalls' the failed Nationalist efforts to codify laws and
strengthen the legal institutions. New laws have been promulgated on
a scale unseen since the 1930's when the Nationalists promulgated a
complete set of new laws, known as the Six Codes. 7 With the enact-
ment of the Criminal Law and the Code of Criminal Procedure,58 as
well as a new constitution,59 the criminal justice system seems to pro-
vide more predictability and equality than at any time in the past four
decades.
The process of law reform under Deng Xiaoping also seeks to
restructure the formal legal institutions damaged by the Cultural
Revolution. The courts, whose authority was supplanted by the police
and other nonjudicial agencies for much of the Communist rule, have
been reorganized and given an enlarged role in the exercise of social
control and the administration of justice in post-Mao China. They are
linked more closely and overtly to the implementation of national pol-
icy, as in the promotion of anti-crime campaigns, 60 the punishment of
56. See Jiang Hua 6th N.P.C. Report on Court, Beijing Xinhua, June 25, 1983 (Foreign
Broadcast Information Service-Daily Report: China [hereinafter FBIS] trans. June 27, 1983, at
K-9). Jiang Hua, then President of the Supreme People's Court, reviewed the legal developments
of the past five years in this work report delivered at the First Session of the Sixth National
People's Congress [hereinafter Jiang Hua 6th NP. C. Report].
57. The Six Codes consisted of the Organic Law, Commercial Law, Civil Code, Criminal
Code, Civil Code of Procedure, and Criminal Code of Procedure.
58. Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6.
59. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Beijing 1983) (promul-
gated Dec. 4, 1982) [hereinafter P.R.C. CONSTITUTION]. While the 1982 Constitution, the
fourth under the Communist leadership, reaffirms China's adherence to the four basic principles
(Socialism, the People's Democratic Dictatorship, Marxism-Leninism, and Mao Zedong
Thought and the Chinese Communist Party leadership), it seeks also to distinguish implicitly the
functions of the state from those of the Party. See especially arts. 5, 126, 131.
60. See Note, Concepts of Law in the Chinese Anti-Crime Campaign, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1890,
1904 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Concepts of Law] (arguing that the Party's prominent role in
implementing anti-crime measures has led to the use of "policy" rather than "law" as a guide for
determining when legal sanctions should be applied).
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political dissidents,61 and the clampdown against economic crime.62
With regard to the latter, the courts have openly joined with the police
and the recently revived procuracy 63 to wage a coordinated battle.
Although article 126 of the Chinese Constitution prohibits interfer-
ence in court affairs by administrative organs, public organizations, or
individuals, the courts remain highly susceptible to Communist Party
influence on broad policy matters and important or complex cases. 64
By continuing to maintain its longstanding central role in the preser-
vation of order in Chinese society, the Party has reinforced the notion
that law and legal institutions are state interests, serving to enhance
state power and discipline the people to carry out state policies.
F. The Aftermath of Tiananmen
Since the demonstrations of spring 1989, there have been at least
forty officially announced death sentences and executions of individu-
als associated with the pro-democracy movement. 65 Numerous unan-
nounced executions are also believed to have taken place.66 Many of
those executed were convicted of crimes against property, such as
burning vehicles, obstructing traffic, and setting fire to trains. For in-
stance, three were executed in Shanghai on June 22 for allegedly burn-
61. See e.g., A. NATHAN, CHINESE DEMOCRACY 33-41 (describing Deng Xiaoping's harsh
criticism of political dissidents and the short-lived democracy movement of 1978-81); Silk, The
Crime of Dissent in China, 34 PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 61, 66 (July-Aug. 1985) (observing the
close resemblance between the "procedural" court that sentenced dissident Wei Jingsheng to
fifteen years imprisonment in 1979 and the "revolutionary" court that sentenced the dissident
Beijing University student Lin Xiling in 1957); S. LENG & H. CHIu, supra note 52, at 145-50
(reviewing the post-Mao leadership's treatment of Chinese political activists and dissidents).
62. See Note, The Death Penalty and Legal Reform in the PRC, 1 J. CHINESE L. 303, 320-21
(1987) [hereinafter Note, The Death Penalty and Legal Reform] (noting that the harshness of
legal sanctions for economic crimes is not surprising in a country where economic reform and
modernization are the primary policy objectives of legal reform).
63. Dismantled during the Cultural Revolution, the procuracy was reinstated by the 1978
organic law of the People's Procuratorates. Its functions include investigating criminal cases,
supervising the police, instituting prosecution, overseeing trial procedures, and scrutinizing the
execution of judgments and prison operations.
64. See Lubman, Western Scholarship on Chinese Law: Past Accomplishments and Present
Challenges, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 83, 95 (1983) [hereinafter Lubman, Western Scholar-
ship] (perceiving a contradiction between the "mass line" style of policy implementation and the
establishment of a regularized legal system); see also Leng, Legal Reform in Post-Mao China: A
Tentative Assessment, in CHINESE POLITICS FROM MAO TO DENG 203, 223 (V. Falkenheim & I.
Kim eds. 1989) [hereinafter Leng, Legal Reform in Post-Mao China] ("In practice, party officials
too often let political considerations prevail over legal requirements.").
65. PUNISHMENT SEASON, supra note 9, at 7.
66. In light of China's past reporting practices on arrests and executions, official Chinese
press statistics probably represent only a small portion of the total number of recent executions.
Id. at 26. The Chinese government has sought to defend its actions by a massive disinformation
campaign, harassment and expulsion of foreign journalists, and the jamming of the Voice of
America and other foreign radio stations. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989, at 802 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 COUNTRY REPORT].
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ing a train. In addition, seven persons were executed in Beijing on
June 22 for allegedly "setting fire to military trucks, stealing military
goods, and assaulting soldiers, ' 67 and two more were executed in
Chengdu in July, allegedly for arson.68 In late October, a Jinan fac-
tory worker was sentenced to death for allegedly setting ablaze a car
during one of the June demonstrations.69 In November, three persons
from Chengdu were given death sentences for burning a cinema during
the period June 4-6. In December, two persons in Beijing were sen-
tenced for beating a policeman to death on the morning of June 4.70
The reappearance of old customs from the Cultural Revolution
years suggests that the legal reforms of the Dengist years have yet to
stabilize themselves. 7' The atmosphere of intimidation carried out by
the police, the public humiliation of offenders with heads shaven and
placards hung around their necks, indicating their names and crimes,
the use of of ideological terms such as "thugs" and "ruffians" who
staged the "counterrevolutionary" 72 rebellion once again demonstrate
the power of the state. In the aftermath of Tiananmen, phrases that
had been downplayed in recent years like "dictatorship of the proleta-
riat" and "class struggle" have also been revived. These post-
Tiananmen developments demonstrate not only that the status of law
has suffered a serious setback, but also that earlier patterns of arbitrary
violence are reasserting themselves. The aging leadership behind
Deng Xiaoping continues to endorse the traditional notion of using
law as a means to shape behavior and further the aims of authoritarian
government.
II. EXTERNAL PRESSURES AND USE OF THE DEATH PENALTY
State attitudes toward the criminal justice process have not been
the sole determinant in deciding the severity of punishment in Chinese
criminal cases. External pressures that impinge upon the govern-
67. 1989 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 66, at 806-07. An eighth "rioter" who was sen-
tenced to death was apparently not executed because his defense lawyer had claimed he was
mentally retarded. AI-1989, supra note 13, at 45.
68. On July 1; 1989, two people were sentenced to death for setting fire to vehicles during
rioting in Chengdu on June 5. AI-1989, supra note 13, at 45.
69. See Shandong Demonstrator Gets Death Sentence, Agence France Presse (Hong Kong),
Nov. 2, 1989, in FBIS, Nov. 3, 1989, at 54.
70. See Two More Beijing Protesters Get Death Sentence, Beijing Domestic Service, Dec. 8,
1989 (FBIS trans. Jan. 3, 1990, at 28).
71. Kristoff, Unleashing the Dark Methods of the Cultural Revolution, N.Y. Times, June 18,
1989, at El, E3 ("The revival of such concepts now inspires fear that China will somehow slip
back toward the terror that marked the last decade of the Maoist period.").
72. See Feinerman, Human Rights in China, 88 CURRENT HISTORY 273, 276 (1989) (linking
the official reappearance of the term "counterrevolution" in labeling student demonstrators to
the norms of criminal law and procedure found during the Cultural Revolution).
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ment's power, such as political and military threats, domestic distur-
bances, or even international criticism, have also shaped Chinese
decisions on whether or not to impose the death sentence. The history
of the past four decades has been dynamic, including extreme shifts in
Party policy that have oscillated between periods of coercion and per-
suasion. 73 These policy shifts have been closely related to the external
pressures confronting the status quo of the ruling powers.
While it is difficult to generalize about the effect of these recurrent
cycles on the use of the death penalty, some basic tendencies are no-
ticeable. In times of greatest threat, during which external pressures
undermine the authority of the leaders, criminal punishment has been
susceptible to greater arbitrariness, capriciousness, and brutality.
Conversely, a relatively peaceful and complacent environment has en-
abled a more regularized legal system to dispense more predictable
and often more lenient punishments. 74 Each episode or phase of harsh
punishment, therefore, must be viewed in light of the political winds
prevailing at a particular time in Chinese history.
75
The political nature of the death penalty in Communist China un-
derscores these alternating cycles of Party policy over the past six de-
cades. In China, the death penalty has been used extensively to
liquidate political enemies, often labeled as "counterrevolutionaries," a
very severe criminal charge clearly containing political overtones.
This display of political power has been achieved through streamlined
and truncated judicial procedures, such as in the case of mass trials or
people's courts, or through the circumvention or evasion of formal
processes entirely, such as when the leadership deliberately sanctions
killing either by specific prior instructions or by collaboration with
other governmental organs. 76 While the basic aims of such actions are
73. See F. TEIWES, POLITICS & PURGES IN CHINA: RECTIFICATION AND THE DECLINE OF
PARTY NORMS 1950-1965, at 608 (1979). Jerome Cohen has referred to the dialectical process
throughout this era as changing in "alternating cycles of pressure and relaxation." Cohen, Crimi-
nal Law: Reflections on the Criminal Process in China, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 323, 331
(1977) [hereinafter Cohen, Criminal Law].
74. Li, Book Review, supra note 11, at 179, 186 ("The feeling of insecurity often leads to
hasty and violent action, which usually takes the form of biennial rectification campaigns during
which the normal rules are abrogated.").
75. Policy changes during the People's Republic have resulted in striking inconsistencies in
the application of the death penalty. For example, many persons who were executed for corrup-
tion during the harsh sentencing of the early years would have only been imprisoned during the
more moderate 1956-57 era. Also, during the "Strike One-Oppose Three" campaign of 1970-71,
the death penalty, used sparingly in cases of economic crimes in the two previous decades, was
applied widely in order to eradicate speculation, corruption, and various blackmarket activity
that proliferated during the lawlessness of the Cultural Revolution. See Cohen, Criminal Law
supra note 73, at 331; see also, S. LENG & H. CHIU, supra note 52, at 25.
76. For a general discussion on the relationship of political prisoners to capital punishment,
see L. SHELEFF, ULTIMATE PENALTIES 10-11 (1987).
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the traditional ones of deterrence and retribution, they take on a differ-
ent significance in a political context. When the aging Chinese leader-
ship decided to use lethal force against the mass protests on June 4 and
subsequently to employ the death penalty less restrictively, it demon-
strated the extent of the political power it was willing to expend in
order to quash threats to its authority. 77
A. Late Imperial China
The traditional legal system functioned most predictably and hu-
manely during periods with strong central government. During times
of political confusion and turmoil, as in the intervals between the great
dynasties when central authority temporarily disintegrated, executive
prerogative shifted from the center to the local civil and military offi-
cials. In such times, normal checks on behavior failed to be effective,
and the administration of justice became both summary and
arbitrary.
78
Throughout imperial times, the death penalty was ordered in ac-
cordance with the dynastic codes for commission of heinous crimes.
The most severe form of punishment, death by slicing,79 was reserved
only for the most ruthless crimes such as high treason, rebellion, mur-
der of the husband, patricide, mutilation of a living person, witchcraft,
and other offenses known as the "Ten Abominations." Although the
frequency of the death penalty during the Qing dynasty is not gener-
ally known,80 it could be surmised that the Manchus, as foreigners in
China, were deeply fearful of possible subversion. In fact, however,
the Qing Code has been deemed mild when compared with the Roman
Twelve Tables which permitted creditors to slice up the body of an
77. Leon Sheleff, writing in 1987 in a context without explicit reference to China, neverthe-
less anticipated and captured the dilemna of Beijing's leadership during the Tiananman tragedy:
In the areas of political crime, it is, after all, not the welfare of the total population that is of
major concern, but the narrow sectarian interests of those holding power, who are intent on
ensuring that they quash any threats to that power, including the use of the full repressive
apparatus of the criminal justice system or the police force.
Id. at 10.
78. When Sichuan province was under the control of a military strongman during the later
Chin dynasty (936-946 A.D.), the secret state police executed countless people for discussing
certain public affairs so that "no one dared to say a word fearing lest the man standing by his side
was a secret agent." This case is told in the Tang- Yin-Bi-Shi, a collection of 144 selected criminal
and civil cases spanning fourteen centuries from 300 B.C. until 1100 A.D. See R. VAN GULIK,
T'ANG-YIN-PI-SHI [TANG-YIN-BI-SHI], Parallel Cases from under the Pear-Tree, A 13th Cen-
tury Manual of Jurisprudence and Detection 140-41 (1956).
79. Under this punishment, also known as "lingering death," the convict's body was slowly
sliced to pieces while he was still alive. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 93.
80. Estimates are available for some periods. Ichisada Miyazaki, for example, has estimated
that about 2,000 criminals were executed every year during the Sung Dynasty (960-1279).
Miyazaki, The Administration of Justice during the Sung Dynasty, in ESSAYS ON CHINA'S LEGAL
TRADITION 56, 69 (J. Cohen, R. Edwards, and F. Chen eds. 1980).
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insolvent debtor. 81
B. The Republican Period
The Guomindang leadership during the later Republican period
confronted a number of enormous problems that weakened its capac-
ity to control society at the local, regional, and national levels. These
problems included the devolution of political and military power in
the hands of regional warlords, civil war, the Japanese invasion, and
economic scarcity. Its power was sapped further by internal dissen-
sion, a corrupt and stagnant bureaucracy, and a lack of effective cen-
tralized control.
In order to stave off such centrifugal pressures and the increasingly
imperative threat from the Communist Party, whose membership ex-
perienced rapid growth beginning in late 1925, the Guomindang re-
gime relied on violence, payoffs, and political compromise of its
authority. Following the collapse of the Nationalist-Communist coali-
tion in 1926, Chiang Kai-shek's assaults on the Communists effec-
tively reduced their membership from 58,000 to 10,000 by late 1927.82
Political arrests, purges, and executions were reported frequently not
only against Commufiists 83 but also against any other potential oppo-
nents of the regime. 84
Amidst these wartime conditions and intensifed political repres-
sion, the hailed legal reforms failed to take root throughout most of
China. Arbitrary military justice and corruption were far more preva-
lent than orderly judicial procedure. 85 Even in the central provinces
under government control, the Guomindang military acted arbitrarily
81. Kim & LeBlang, The Death Penalty in Imperial China, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 77, 90
n.51 (1975).
82. F. SCHURMANN, supra note 48, at 129. One of the most brutal attacks occurred in April,
1927, when paramilitary groups opened machine-gun fire on left-wing strikers in Shanghai, kill-
ing as many as 5000 workers.
83. In April, 1927, the Beijing metropolitan police even stormed the Soviet embassy com-
pound, where Chinese Communists had sought sanctuary during the previous year. Following a
cursory trial by a Chinese court in Beijing, twenty Communists and left-wing Guomindang mem-
bers - including one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, Li Dazhao - were
executed by strangulation. M. MEISNER, Li TA-CHAO AND THE ORIGINS OF CHINESE MARX-
ISM 259 (1979); C.M. WILBUR, THE NATIONALIST REVOLUTION IN CHINA 1923-1928, at 103-
04 (1983).
84. Other targets included non-Guomindang organizations such as the China Youth Party or
individual critics like Hu Shi. Thousands of persons with no relations to the Communists were
killed. L. EASTMAN, THE ABORTIVE REVOLUTION: CHINA UNDER NATIONALIST RULE, 1927-
1937, at 6-7 (1974).
85. Tay, Law in Communist China - Part 1, 6 SYDNEY L. REV. 153, 165 (1969) ("Before
the people even had time to consider the impact of the new laws on their traditional ways of
dealing with inheritance, social and familial relations, divorce and commerce, law schools were
being evacuated, courts burned, and the centres of government moved away from the
Japanese.").
1004 (Vol. 11:987
Note, Death Penalty in China
and destructively, arresting and executing so-called "bandits" or "rob-
bers" without any formal court procedure, and often in particularly
merciless fashion.86 Chiang's encirclement and annihilation cam-
paigns in the early 1930's again wiped out Communist Party member-
ship, depleting the numbers from 300,000 to just 40,000 between 1934
and 1937.87
In addition to being weakened by the continuing struggle with the
Communists, the Nationalist regime faced the Japanese presence in
Manchuria after 1931,88 and suffered a loss of control over China's
southwest which was under warlord control. The legal reforms
promulgated in 1935, therefore, had limited reach, and they soon be-
came obsolete when war broke out with Japan in 1937. When the
Second World War finally ended in 1945, the Nationalists were still
embroiled in civil war and would be overthrown by the Communists
within four years.
C. The Early Chinese Communist Experience.: 1927-49
The Communists, struggling for military power from their rural
bases, were attempting prior to 1949 to devise strategies for building a
strong central state. The need to control territorial sanctuaries
strongly influenced their attitude towards law and use of the death
penalty. The survival of the Party as a viable revolutionary movement
depended upon its control of these territories. During the war-domi-
nated years of the Republican era when both sides tenaciously vied for
power, the Communists, like the Guomindang, also used coercive and
violent means to suppress opposition.8 9
As early as the 1927 peasant uprisings at the Hailufeng Soviet in
Guangdong province, the Communists permitted peasants to freely ex-
ecute counterrevolutionaries. Under the Chinese Soviet system, gov-
ernments at the county, district, and township levels all had judicial
committees or officials to handle litigation and try counterrevolutiona-
86. Michael, The Role of Law in Traditional, Nationalist, and Communist China, 9 CHINA
Q. 124, 134 (1962); see also P. BILLINGSLEY, BANDITS IN REPUBLICAN CHINA 47 (1988)
(describing how the decapitated heads of bandit leaders were displayed, suspended in cages on
the city walls or gates, as a warning to the populace to forego the path of outlawry).
87. Not all were killed in these campaigns; some deserted. See F. SCHURMANN, supra note
48, at 129 (1968).
88. Following the "Mukden incident" of September 18, 1931, Japanese troops took over
Manchuria and later established a puppet state, known as Manchukuo.
89. Scattered reports from HONGSE ZHONGGUO (RED CHINA) from the spring of 1933 on-
ward indicate that the State Political Security Bureau had executed criminals without mention of
any trial. A decree issued by the Council of People's Commissars on February 9, 1934, citing
the military situation at the time, empowered the Security Bureau to directly punish counter-
revolutionaries without going through the courts. T. LbTVEIT, CHINESE COMMUNISM 1931-
1934: EXPERIENCE IN CIVIL GOVERNMENT 122 (1979).
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ries.90 One Communist source reported that 1,822 landlords were exe-
cuted within just a few months.9 1 In many cases, the accused were
killed on the spot before cheering crowds at anti-counterrevolutionary
meetings.
Between 1927 and 1933, the Communist Party was fragmented by
internal dissension, hounded by the Guomindang, and diverted from
the task of establishing a unified legal policy. Hence, the Party's ap-
proach towards the death penalty was shaped primarily by its compe-
tition with the Guomindang and its central concern with seizing and
maintaining territory. Accordingly, it defined the term "counterrevo-
lutionary" broadly enough to encompass a range of enemies based on
economic class, political party, or overt action against the Communist
Party. A variety of punishments were used; persons sentenced to
death were usually shot, although in some cases the traditional prac-
tice of mutilating the body by beheading was used.92 Penal legislation
of the Chinese Soviet Republic was virtually non-existent prior to
1933.
93
By 1933, a stronger Guomindang threat necessitated more expedi-
tious procedures for handling counterrevolutionaries and other
criminals. The previous method of requiring a superior's approval
before carrying out the death sentence was declared inappropriate;
only those cases in which the offender appealed his sentence were re-
viewed at the higher level. 94 Lower-level cadres with suspect or lim-
ited judicial training, therefore, were delegated discretion to execute
criminals with no means of re-examination until after the fact. In ad-
dition, the right of appeal was shortened from fourteen to seven
days. 95 Furthermore, the tasks typically performed by the judicial or-
gans were increasingly replaced by the Political Security Bureau,
which was given the right to arrest and detain suspects, conduct mass
trials, and even execute offenders without the approval of the courts.
The Communists justified these changes by explaining that when they
were in particular danger (i.e. when territory was not yet firmly under
Communist control, when the Guomindang was attacking, or when
the Party was leading a campaign) they required more power to con-
90. The Hai-feng Soviet government had a nine-man judicial committee; each district gov-
ernment had a five-man judicial committee; each township government had one judge. S. LENG,
supra note 46, at 2-3 n. 10.
91. Id. at 3.
92. P. GRIFFIN, supra note 41, at 36.
93. See id. at 128-29.
94. Id. at 47.
95. Id.
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trol political opposition.96
From 1934 onward, the CCP leadership demonstrated strong con-
tempt for laws and regulations, warning local cadres not to permit the
fight against counterrevolutionaries to be restrained by legal consider-
ations. Increasingly, mob emotion rather than legal procedure fueled
the public trials, which uniformly prescribed the death sentence as
punishment. 97 Once the leaders had subordinated law to the demands
of the revolution, terror was unleashed in the tenuously-held war
zones and border areas.98
The Communists began to restrain these revolutionary excesses
when victory appeared imminent in late 1948. Policy directives and
proclamations spoke of providing protection for human rights and
democratic freedom. Communist leaders began to formalize and regu-
late court procedure and prohibit corporal punishment and indiscrimi-
nate killing.99 However, in areas involved in thefanshen land reform
movement, t°° the commissioner's office could still authorize lower
level cadres to carry out immediate executions upon the township
magistrate's approval. ' 0 '
D. The People's Republic of China
After taking power in 1949, the Communist Party again con-
fronted severe economic crises, divisive internal conflict both within
the Party and from opponents outside the regime, and shifting foreign
policy alignments - all of which generated a pervasive fear of threats
to its control over the country. One of the tools used by the leadership
to resist this opposition was the system of mass on-the-spot trials,
96. Id. at 49.
97. See T. LOVEIT, supra note 89, at 128-29.
98. The Commissar of Justice, Liang Botai, complained that the judicial organs must under-
stand that law serves to meet the needs of the revolution: "What is to the advantage of the
revolution, that is the law." Zhang Wentian, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars,
warned that counterrevolutionary activity from within was intensifying: "Red terror ought to be
our reply to these counter-revolutionaries. We must, especially in the war zones and the border
areas, deal immediately and with extreme swiftness with every sort of counter-revolutionary ac-
tivity .... they shall all be shot on the spot." Id. at 140-41.
99. For example, one regulation on judicial procedures published by the North China Peo-
ple's Government required that all capital sentences passed by the lower courts be reviewed by
the North China People's Court and the Chairman of the North China People's Government for
final approval. S. LENG, supra note 46, at 24-25.
100. This campaign literally translated means "to turn over." See generally W. HINTON,
FANSHEN: A DOCUMENTARY OF REVOLUTION IN A CHINESE VILLAGE (1966) (describing con-
ditions in a northern village during this campaign of the late 1940's); see also M. FRIED, FABRIC
OF CHINESE SOCIETY: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL LIFE OF A CHINESE COUNTY SEAT (1953)
(examining the social relationships existing between landlords and peasants, as well as other
classes, in an Anhui village on the eve of the Communist takeover).
101. See P. GRIFFIN, supra note 41, at 101-02.
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where death sentences were carried out immediately. Although prop-
agated from the central government, these summary executions were
encouraged by mob rule and individual cadres who regarded the pol-
icy as necessary to overcome local elite power still entrenched from
the former socio-political order. The bloody Land Reform campaign
of 1949-51, which led to the trial and execution of perhaps a million
people, 10 2 illustrated the unrestrainable terror that could be unleashed
during such revolutionary frenzy. Victor Li advises that such in-
stances of extreme brutality must be viewed within their proper con-
text- here within the context of a revolution. 0 3 Mao Zedong, after
all, had warned that violence inevitably accompanied the overthrow of
the old order:
[A] revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a
picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and
gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A
revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class over-
throws another. 104
During land reform and the campaign to suppress counterrevolu-
tionaries that was launched in February, 1951, the Communists
branded landlords, rich peasants, and persons with capitalist back-
grounds as opponents of the regime. Individuals perceived as
Guomindang agents were also targeted and ruthlessly oppressed. Us-
ing an extremely broad definition to identify counterrevolutionaries,
the Party treated these individuals as enemies of, and threats to, the
system it was seeking to establish. Some of the most violent cam-
paigns were launched after China's entry into the Korean War in late
1950. The Party, aware of the possibility of sabotage operations by
political opponents, perceived an increasing need for vigilance. Thus,
in September, 1950, just prior to the decision to intervene, Mao an-
nounced, "[I]t is imperative that we adhere to a policy of not killing
even a single agent"; in January, 1951, he declared that "we must
firmly kill all those reactionary elements who deserve to be killed."' 0 5
102. J. DOMES, THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF CHINA, 1949-1972, 51-52 (1973) [hereinafter J.
DOMES]. The sum total of the victims of this campaign is unclear. At the eighth Party Congress
of the Chinese Communist Party in September, 1956, the Minister of Public Security Luo Ruiq-
ing talked of 800,000 executions. The Minister of Finance Bo Yibo, however, proposed a figure
of more than two million in a work report published in Beijing in late 1952. See B. STAVIS, THE
POLITICS OF AGRICULTURAL MECHANIZATION IN CHINA 25-30 (1978) (using Western and Chi-
nese sources to arrive at a cautious estimate of between 400,000 and 800,000 deaths).
103. Li, Book Review, supra note 11, at 184-85 (1968) (Given the extreme brutality of the
Guomindang's annihilation campaigns, "it was no surprise that the Communist victory of 1949
was accompanied by a desire for revenge and a resolve to eradicate the enemy class.").
104. Mao Tse-tung, Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan (1927), 1
SELECTED WORKS 23, 28 (Peking 1967).
105. Comments on the Work of Suppressing and Liquidating Counterrevolutionaries (1950-
51), in MISCELLANY, supra note 50, at 6.
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Following a brief relaxation from the violence in 1956-57, the
Party's "anti-rightist" campaign of 1957-58 systematically resumed
the brutal disciplining of critics of its regime. In August, 1957, a mass
court sentenced three leaders of the student movement in Wuhan to
the death penalty. Execution was carried out immediately and with-
out the constitutionally requisite approval of the People's Supreme
Court. From July to October, another 400 executions of opponents of
the Party were reported. 0 6 This comparatively limited physical liqui-
dation of critics was soon accompanied by an "education through la-
bor" campaign, which authorized the security authorities to send
criminal offenders, counterrevolutionaries, and "reactionaries" to
forced labor camps without trial for an indefinite time until sufficiently
"educated."
Much of the Red Guard violence during the early phase of the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was aimed at critics and oppo-
nents of Mao, in particular, rather than the Party in general. Follow-
ing Mao's order to "smash Gongjianfa (police, procuracy, and
courts)," the Red Guards attacked the Public Security organs for
abusing power, taking reactionary positions, and failing to carry out
the mass line. Mao purged large numbers of cadres without resort to
any formal judicial process. 10 7 In a self-criticism speech of January,
1967, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi admitted the execution
in the latter half of 1966 of more than 400,000 members of the "work
teams," or units sent by the central and provincial Party leadership to
implement Party policies among the population. s08 The People's Lib-
eration Army oversaw the administration of justice during this anar-
chic period until 1973, when normalcy seemed to reappear in the legal
arena. 109
Also during the Cultural Revolution, even parents of students sent
down to the countryside played a role in influencing government pol-
icy toward criminal punishment. During Mao's program of resettling
young school graduates from the cities in the countryside, the Party
issued a policy that imposed severe punishment on those persons in
the rural areas who had any sexual relations with the young urban
106. If these data from most of the cities and a few rural areas were projected to the entire
country, then altogether less than a thousand opponents of the Party were executed. Domes
compiled these figures from reports by national, local, and Hong Kong newspapers. J. DOMES,
supra note 102, at 83.
107. S. LENG & H. CHIU, supra note 52, at 18.
108. Although top-level Party leaders, against whom the purge had been initially directed,
generally were not physically attacked, at the lower level many victims died. See J. DOMES,
supra note 102, at 167 (1973).
109. See S. LENG & H. CHIU, supra note 52, at 18.
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women. Numerous executions were carried out in accordance with
this policy, which had been adopted partly in response to complaints
from parents who were outraged that their daughters were being taken
advantage of in villages far from home while at the mercy of local
officials. 110
E. The People's Republic After 1978
Since 1979, Communist leadership has faced the problems of in-
creasing crime in society, pressures to liberalize from the outside
world, further internal dissension, and serious economic pressures.
Yet, none of these forces were strong enough to distract Deng's intro-
duction of legal reforms. The number of cases involving "counter-
revolutionaries" dropped markedly in the late 1970's, reaching a
reported low of 0.5 percent of all criminal cases in 1982.111
Until recently, China has remained conspicuously absent from the
human rights debates in the United States and Europe that focused on
the human rights records of countries receiving economic or military
aid from the West. 11 2 To a large extent, this exclusion stemmed from
the West's lack of access to and leverage in China, that came with
many years of economic, diplomatic, and military isolation. Yet, well
after Richard Nixon's historic visit in 1972, China remained largely
exempt from the human rights standards applied by the West to other
countries. "13
While Western external pressure on China in the human rights
sphere remains subtle, if not suppressed, Western governments now
have greater economic and military leverage to undertake human
rights initiatives with the People's Republic. Occasionally, these gov-
ernments have demonstrated greater resolve in criticizing Chinese
110. This Party policy was called po-huai shang-shan xia-xiang zui, "the crime of sabotaging
the policy of living on the mountains and settling down in the countryside." Thomas Bernstein
has noted that cases of sexual misconduct at the time were not reported in the Chinese press. T.
BERNSTEIN, UP TO THE MOUNTAINS AND DOWN TO THE VILLAGES: THE TRANSFER OF
YOUTH FROM URBAN TO RURAL CHINA 340 n.80 (1977).
111. Jiang Hua 6th N.P.C Report, supra note 56, at K-3.
112. This section on China's exemption from the human rights debates in the West has been
drawn from Roberta Cohen, People's Republic of China: The Human Rights Exception, 9
HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 447, 471-91 (1987) [hereinafter Cohen, Human Rights Exception].
113. For example, in 1975 the communist countries of Eastern Europe signed on to the Hel-
sinki Final Act, which authorized the Western governments and non-governmental organziations
to monitor Soviet and East European compliance with the human rights provisions set forth in
the Act. The Jackson-Vanik Agreement of 1974 also focused on the human rights records of the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe by linking their emigration restrictions to the extension of
most favored national treatment in trade. Id. at 473.
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human rights policies.11 4 Gradually, too, the Chinese leadership has
become more responsive to human rights initiatives and pressure from
the West. Recent rulings indicate that Chinese courts have dispensed
lighter sentences to those defendants who received international
attention. 15
Since 1984, the Chinese authorities have publicly countered the
negative international coverage of their use of the death penalty and
other punishments." ' 6 Although they continue to insist that their legal
system and human rights record is an internal matter into which the
international arena should not intrude, they have begun to respond to
their critics. 11 7 Pleas on behalf of international human rights organi-
zations, however, have played a minimal role, if any, in encouraging
the Communists to curb police abuses and adhere to international
human rights standards. Party politics and institutional inertia still
restrain any major attempts to rectify the problems of abuse.
F. The Aftermath of Tiananmen
With at least forty persons put to death for activities related to pro-
democracy demonstrations since June 4, the government has reacted
more severely against political opposition than at any time since the
Cultural Revolution. In the past, the Chinese leaders tended to spare
political dissidents, sentencing them instead to lengthy terms in forced
labor camps. Chinese officials, however, contend that the executed
persons are "hoodlums," guilty of committing common crimes such as
arson, theft, or destruction of state property, rather than political
offenses. 118
In the months following the massacre in Tiananmen, the senior
leaders have imposed tighter control over those persons whom the
114. For instance, a 1985 Congressional resolution condemned Chinese forced abortion and
sterilization as "crimes against humanity." Id. at 527.
115. Silk, supra note 61, at 68. For instance, the release of Hanson Huang, a Hong Kong-
born, Harvard-trained lawyer, who was given a fifteen-year imprisonment sentence on a spying
charge, followed a campaign of international protest. Cohen, Human Rights Exception, supra
note 112, at 532.
116. While the Chinese leaders remained silent about Amnesty International's first 1978 re-
port on China and its 1983 memorandum, the Ministry of Justice in 1984 publicly denied the
charges in Amnesty's 1984 report that political prisoners were still subject to secret detention and
mistreatment, and denial of fair trial. Cohen, Human Rights Exception, supra note 112, at 533.
117. In November, 1984, following Amnesty International's repeated denunciations of the
executions of counterrevolutionaries and criminals, the Ministry of Public Security defended the
anti-crime campaign. In a press conference, a Ministry spokesperson defended the necessity of
executions to educate the public but denied that there were any political prisoners or dissidents in
China. The Foreign Ministry also sought to counter criticism abroad by stating that Amnesty
International's calls for the curtailment of executions and the abolition of the death penalty
reflected "Western legal opinions" inappropriately imposed on China. Id.
118. Weisskopf, Executions Continue in China, Wash. Post, June 23, 1989, at Al, A30.
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leadership views as constituting "hostile elements at home." 1' 9 Offi-
cials have been ordered to concentrate on ideological and political
work, and to heighten vigilance against those "factors leading to social
instability."'' 20 Governments at all levels have also been called upon
to strengthen police units in order to tighten public security.
The Chinese leadership, as it has frequently done during periods of
internal instability, has sought to attach blame to the outside world,
particularly Taiwan and the United States. Beijing has accused the
former of exploiting the student demonstrations and escalating them
into an anticommunist movement, while criticizing the latter for its
human rights protests and sanctions that unduly interfere in China's
internal affairs. "The Chinese have never yielded to external pres-
sure," said a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman. "It is unwise and fruit-
less to exert political or economic pressure on China."' 121
In the aftermath of Tiananmen, however, the Chinese have found
themselves susceptible to outside foreign pressure, especially as the
country struggled with its own financial difficulties. Economic pres-
sures, most particularly in the form of inflation, unemployment, and
slow growth, contributed to the lifting of martial law in January,
1990.122 Just days later, the Chinese leaders freed nearly 600 pro-de-
mocracy demonstrators from jail in what appeared to be another ges-
ture to gain goodwill for sorely needed foreign loans and investments.
While the lifting of martial law was regarded by foreign companies as
a necessary condition for a better business climate, China's deteriorat-
ing economy still suffered from tight credit, reduced demand, and
shortages of raw materials and foreign exchange.1 23
III. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DEATH PENALTY
Both deterrence and retribution have been the primary motivations
119. See Kristof, China's Premier Urges Tighter Control, N.Y. Times, March 21, 1990, at A3.
At the formal opening of the National People's Congress, Prime Minister Li Peng expressed the
official hard line policy on social control:
While fostering socialist democracy and the socialist legal system, we must intensify dicta-
torship by the socialist state apparatus .... Prosecutors and judges should fully perform
their duties and be on the alert so that they can promptly crush attempts at infiltration and
subversion by foreign hostile forces, and so that they can crack down on all sabotage by
hostile elements at home.
120. Id.
121. Id. at Al.
122. See Kristof, China Seeks Respectability, but Painlessly, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1990, Sec.
4, at 1. Within hours of China's ending of martial law, the United States announced that it was
easing its blanket opposition to World Bank loans to China. Pear, Martial Law Ends in China's
Capital, US. Easing Curbs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1990, at 1.
123. WuDunn, Business Wary about End of Martial Law in Beijing, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12,
1990, at 3.
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in China's use of the death penalty over the years. In describing the
purposes that punishment may serve, or may be perceived to serve, in
the Chinese context, the edges between the different justifications are
not easy to separate. The Chinese leadership continues to resoit to
draconic measures to instill fear in the populace.
A. The Question of Deterrence
At present, deterrence seems to be the main justification for capital
punishment in China. According to this doctrine, the death penalty
aims to deter both actual and potential offenders from the commission
of crimes. The severity of the punishment should not be greater than
that which is necessary to prevent crime. This emphasis on the deter-
rent function of the death penalty has consistently been a central fea-
ture of criminal law throughout Chinese history.
1. Severity of Punishment as Deterrence
Chinese authorities have long recognized the need for heavy penal-
ties and exemplary sentences in order to deter crime. The traditional
use of graduating degrees of harsh punishment 124 reflects the Chinese
belief that the severity of the punishment is relevant to its degree of
deterrence.1 25 The Chinese Legalists, who regarded law as essential
for effectively controlling the population, ardently advocated the use
of harsh laws as a means to deter wrongdoing. Viewing human nature
as fundamentally selfish, the Legalists believed that only deterrence
through fear could prevent the commission of wrongful acts. 126 The
Guanzi,127 an eclectic work ascribed to Confucianists under strong le-
galist influence, expressed the importance of stringent laws: "[I]f a
punishment does not inspire fear, cruel people will violate the prohibi-
tions readily. The people will obey only when they are submissive to
124. The Chinese use the term wu xing, "the five punishments," to connote their most seri-
ous legal punishments. While this notion has been traced back to the non-Chinese Miao people
in the twenty-third century B.C., it was the Sui Code of 581-83 which delineated the five punish-
ments that basically have remained until this day:
1. Beating with a light stick (5 degrees: 10 to 50 blows)
2. Beating with a heavy stick (5 degrees: 60 to 100 blows)
3. Penal servitude (5 degrees: 1-3 years)
4. Legal exile (3 degrees of distances: 2,000 to 3,000 li) [3 li = I mile]
5. Death (2 degrees: strangulation and decapitation)
As for later changes, the most important addition was a third degree of death penalty: death by
slicing. D.BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 76-78, 93.
125. A number of four-character Chinese idioms reflect this ancient faith in the power of
deterrence. Shaji he hou, literally "kill the chicken to frighten the monkey," means punishing
someone as a warning to others. Sha yijing bai translates as "execute one as a warning to a
hundred."
126. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 24, 99.
127. The Guanzi probably dates from the third century B.C.
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power and execution."1 28
Ever since the sixth century, the standard death penalties, in in-
creasing order of severity, were strangulation and decapitation.
Although strangulation caused a more prolonged, painful death than
decapitation, it was considered the less severe punishment for social
and religious reasons. 129 A less ancient form of death, considered even
more severe than either strangulation or decapitation, was "death by
slicing," also called "lingering death." Under this punishment, the
convict's body was slowly sliced to pieces while he or she was still
alive.' 30 The aim was not so much to inflict torture as it was to de-
stroy the present life and, more importantly, the future spirit of the
offender.
When the Qing dynasty codifiers redrafted the Ming Code in 1740,
they retained the traditional capital punishments of "strangulation"
and "decapitation" where originally cited in the statutes. Although,
by this time "strangulation" usually was commuted to exile, the severe
terminology was probably continued because of its supposed deterrent
effect.t 3t The reluctance of the Qing codifiers to alter the older lan-
guage of such severe sentences, which actually were often reduced to
more lenient penalties, demonstrates the Chinese reverence for tradi-
tion as well as the hope that the forceful wording of punishment provi-
sions would deter wrongdoing.
132
Since consolidating power in 1949, the Communist Chinese regime
has used brute terror against enemies of the state, criminals, or persons
who represented the elite of the former socio-political order. During
the early land reform period, the leaders insisted on violent class war-
fare in every village to destroy the vestiges of the traditional power
structure in local communities. At least one landlord, and usually
128. T. C'Hu, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 266 (1961).
129. Chinese filial piety taught that a person's body was a bequest from his parents rather
than his own property. Decapitation, therefore, was unfilial because it mutilated one's body;
strangulation, by contrast, left the body whole with the spirit intact. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS,
supra note 4, at 92.
130. According to the Chinese legal historian Shen Jiaben, each executioner had his own
technique for carrying out the death by slicing, the procedure of which was not defined in the
dynastic codes. Although slight variations were reported in different localities, a typical proce-
dure involved the infliction of eight cuts upon the victim. The executioner made successive cuts
upon the victim's face, his two hands, two feet, breast, stomach, and the final slicing off of the
head. Niida Noboru, the preeminent Japanese scholar of Chinese law, presented a much more
gruesome picture of the slicing death. He indicates that as many as 24, 36, 72, or over 120 cuts
might have been inflicted upon the victim. Id. at 93-94.
131. See id. at 99.
132. Id.
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more, were chosen from nearly every village for public execution. 133
In a typical execution, the victim kneels in front of two or three
standing soldiers, policemen, or officers from the Public Security Bu-
reau. His hands are commonly tied behind his back. In a tradition
that dates back to imperial China, when executioners approached
from the rear for fear that the victim's souls might return to haunt
them, the pistol is placed against the base of the man's neck. After a
single shot, the body is rolled over and photographed for the court
record.' 34 The family of the deceased is required to pay one yuan for
the cost of the bullet.
1 35
2. Publicity of Punishment as Deterrence
For the threat of capital punishment to be effective, communica-
tion networks and propaganda is essential. The death penalty has
been widely publicized in the belief that its emotional effect would be
strongest if more people witnessed or heard about trials and execu-
tions. Frequently, authorities have sought to capture the attention of a
threatened audience by making examples of select lawbreakers. The
severe sentencing of offenders is intended to send to potential criminals
a powerful message that will result in general deterrence.1 36 As Liu
Yunfeng, president of the Beijing High People's Court, explained,
"We sentence people to death not to seek revenge but to educate
others - by killing one we educate one hundred."'
137
The importance of publicizing negative examples reflects both the
133. A. Doak Barnett has described the emotional potency of such public executions on the
local populace:
"[T]he killings [of landlords] had a lasting imprint on the attitudes of everyone, including
the ordinary peasants; it impressed upon them the power of the new regime and its capacity
to use arbitrary and extreme violence, if and when it wished, against all persons classified as
enemies of the state."
A.D. BARNETT, supra note 44, at 228-29.
134. See, e.g., AI-1984, supra note 7, 73; Bums, When Peking Fights Crime, News Is on the
Wall, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1986, at 2 [hereinafter Bums, When Peking Fights Crime]. The use of
a single shot in the back of the head, a method traditionally favored for executions in the Soviet
Union and other Communist countries, has generally been used in nonpublic executions in which
ceremony is not considered necessary. Since the pistol if fired in contact with the head, there is
no chance of missing and one shot generally kills instantly. Method of Execution: A Stark Tradi-
tion, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1989, at A10.
135. See, e.g., Lee, Happy Holidays and Busy Killing Fields, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV.,
Feb. 20, 1986, at 47.
136. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CON-
TROL 141-49 (1973) (arguing that the effective operation of deterrence as a means of social con-
trol depends on the effective communication of threats of punishments and their concrete
exemplifications to the public).
137. Lee, supra note 135, at 47. A spokesman for the Ministry of Public Security said in
1984: "Facts show that the executions of a small number of criminals guilty of the most heinous
crimes have contributed to the education of the majority of the criminals." Sun, China Reports
Sharp Drop in Crime Rate, Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 1984, at A33.
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underlying traditional Chinese belief in the malleability of man138 and
Mao Zedong's great faith in "mass line" governance. 139 Thus, for
many trials and executions, the masses have been mobilized to observe
and learn. Almost all cases are heard in public, 140 often held in large
stadiums, and are generally open to people with admission tickets dis-
tributed through organizations designated by the auth6rities141
Adopted by the Chinese Communists during the Soviet period of
1927-1934, mass trials 142 are envisioned as a means to involve the pop-
ulace directly in the legal process. Cases of important propaganda
value have been carefully staged to inspire fear and class hatred, and
to endorse government decisions against the accused. 143 The size of a
mass sentencing rally has totaled as many as 100,000 people. 144
In addition to the mass trials, modem technology and the media -
in particular, television, radio, and the press - have been utilized to
disseminate news of executions to a wider audience. Occasionally, the
announcement of death sentences at mass trials and even executions
138. See Munro, The Malleability of Man in Chinese Marxism, 48 CHINA Q. 609, 639 (1971)
("The belief that people are educable is a self-fulfilling prophecy which may produce the effort or
the climate that makes some change for the better in individuals possible.").
139. "Mass line" refers to the highly responsive relationship of the Communist Party to the
general population. See, e.g., S. SCHRAM, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG 315-18
(1969).
140. Cases involving minors, state secrets, or personal intimacies are the exceptions. See S.
LENG & H. CHIU, supra note 52, at 91.
141. Id.
142. Mass trials were well prepared, widely publicized, and carefully orchestrated in order to
create an atmosphere of dignity. At the trial anyone could make accusations against the accused,
and court members and people's representatives frequently used the opportunity to give inflam-
matory speeches. With an audience now aroused, the trials often concluded with a swift sentence
and immediate execution. Jerome Cohen has characterized these trials as "morality plays" be-
cause of their careful staging and educational objectives. See J. COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCESS,
supra note 11, at 13; Edwards, Reflections on Crime and Punishment in China, with Appended
Sentencing Documents, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45, 59 (1977) ("[T]he proceedings called
'mass trials' are not really trials but are rather educational dramas staged to heighten the vigi-
lance of the masses."); LENG, supra note 46, at 35 ("A facade of legality was provided by the
judiciary which unfailingly gave formal approval to the verdicts 'demanded' by the masses.").
143. Shao-chuan Leng has described one of the huge mass trials for the accusation of
counter-revolutionaries held by the Peking Municipal People's Government on May 21, 1951:
Speaking before the aroused crowd, [Luo Ruiqing], Minister of Public Security, "sug-
gested" that some 220 criminals be sentenced to death. He was followed by Mayor [Peng
Zhen] who wound up the drama by saying: "What shall we do with such a group of beasts
as these vicious despots, bandits, traitors, and special agents?" "Shoot them!" the audience
shouted. "Right, they should be shot," the Mayor replied. "Following this meeting we
shall hand over the cases to the Military court of the Municipal Military Control Commis-
sion for conviction. Tomorrow, conviction; the next day, execution." The crowd responded
with wild applause and loud cheers.
LENG, supra note 46, at 35.
144. On August 23, 1983, during the anti-crime campaign of that month, thirty persons were
executed in Beijing following a mass rally of 100,000 people. AI-1984, supra note 7, at 59
(1984).
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have been shown on Chinese television. 45 On January 30, 1986, the
Shenyang City Intermediate People's Court sentenced fourteen
criminals to death, while more than 200,000 people throughout the
city listened to the live relay at some 150 assembly sites.' 46 Despite
the message of article 155 of the new Law of Criminal Procedure, stat-
ing that "the condemned should not be exposed to the public,"
147
some executions continue to be carried out in public and some corpses
still remain exposed afterwards. 148  Furthermore, prior to execution,
condemned prisoners are often paraded in public with' their heads
bowed and placards proclaiming their crimes hung around their
necks, 149 a practice particularly widespread during the Cultural
Revolution.
The leadership has also used other means of propaganda to send
messages to the populace about the harshness of the death sentence.
In Beijing, the government has emphasized the seriousness of execu-
tions by placing posters 50 on the main streets and at major intersec-
tions which publicize execution notices with the names of the
condemned underlined in red and, on occasion, their photos, with
heads shaven, provided for added effect. 15' Posters bearing large red
check marks signify that the sentences have been carried out. 152 In
addition to execution notices, government propagandists have utilized
other forms of communication, like comic strips, to pass on stern
messages about the severity of the law.153  Chinese newspapers still
145. One mass sentencing rally with 100,000 people in attendance in Taiyuan was televised in
July, 1981. Id. at 73. The execution of Xiong Ziping, one of twin brothers from Hangzhou
convicted of rape, was shown on China's television news in November, 1979, reportedly with
only two seconds of the pistol firing cut from the film. Mathews, Plagued by Crime, Chinese
Increase Use of Executions, Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 1980, at Al3.
146. Shenyang Rally Sentences 14 Criminals to Death, Shenyang Liaoning Provincial Ser-
vice, Jan. 30, 1986 (FBIS trans. Feb. 4, 1986, at S-8).
147. Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, art. 155.
148. AI-1984, supra note 7, at 73-74. The practice of parading criminals through the streets
has been criticized by Jiang Hua, the president of the Supreme People's Court, and other mem-
bers of the Communist Party's Central Committee. Campbell, China Suddenly Taking a
Tougher Line on Crime, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1983, at A2.
149. See, e.g., Campbell, To Shame Its Felons, China Puts Them on Parade, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 16, 1983, at A2 ("The public humiliation of condemned criminals is an ancient Chinese
custom that was revived with a vengeance during the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960's and
early 1970's" and "appears to have been called into service again to dramatize the campaign
against crime.").
150. Court posters describing the crimes are popular with many people because their lurid
details contrast favorably with the bland fare available in the official Chinese press. For instance,
one poster detailed the story of an executed factory manager, who was said to have put arsenic
into the rice at the home of his married lover after she decided to curtail the affair. Both the
woman's husband and daughter died. Bums, When Peking Fights Crime, supra note 134.
151. See Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), Aug. 23, 1983, in FBIS, Aug. 23, 1983, at K-5.
152. See, e.g., Bums, When Peking Fights Crime, supra note 134.
153. One such comic strip posted near the fine arts museum in Beijing illustrated a man's
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continue to cover executions as a form of popular education and gen-
eral deterrence of crime. 15 4 In a commentary about a former Commu-
nist Party official who was executed for taking more than $29,000
worth of goods seized from smugglers, the Yangcheng Evening News
of Guangzhou wrote, "Execute one as a warning to a hundred."'
' 55
3. Frequency of Punishment as Deterrence
If capital punishment is to serve as a deterrent, then executions
should be frequent rather than scarce and sporadic. When China ex-
perienced a significant jump in its crime rate during the early post-
Mao period, the Chinese leaders increased the use of the death penalty
in 1979-80.156 As the number of serious crimes continued to rise, 157 in
large part due to the increasing liberalization of Chinese society, the
government launched an anti-crime campaign in 1981 and again re-
sorted to more frequent use of the death penalty. Beijing Review com-
mented, "Anyone without bias who is really concerned with the
welfare of the people in this part of the world will feel pleased that
China is cracking down on crime."15
A wave of mass executions immediately followed the launching of
the anti-crime campaign of August, 1983. Foreign press reports esti-
mated that more than 5,000 executions were carried out during the
first three months of the campaign. 5 9 Within five months, some one
hundred persons had been put to death in Beijing 60 and at least 120
attempt to kill his wife who refused to divorce him in order that he could marry his mistress.
The cartoon depicted the husband's attempt to kill his wife by gassing and his later successful
electrocution of her with the help of his mistress. Such comic strips often conclude with the
accused standing before the court handcuffed and with bowed heads as their offenses and
sentences are read out. Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), Aug. 23, 1983, in FBIS, Aug. 23,
1983, at K-5.
154. Commenting on the death sentence given to a Public Security Bureau official for brib-
ery, Nanfang Ribao clearly indicated that the purpose of the execution was deterrence: "The
example of the degradation of Ou Chujie is rare negative educational material. We should not let
this example go by easily but make use of it to the fullest extent." Guangdong's Foshan City
Executes Corrupt Official, Nanfang Ribao (Guangzhou) Apr. 12, 1987 (FBIS trans. Apr. 16,
1987, at P-2) [hereinafter Guangdong's Foshan City Executes Corrupt Official] (emphasis added).
155. To Cheers of Crowd, China Condemns 30, Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1983, at A17.
156. A review of official press and courthouse notices revealed that at least 198 people had
been executed, and another 214 sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve in the twelve months
preceding June 30, 1980. Most of the persons executed had been convicted of murder or rape;
others were convicted of armed robbery, drug peddling, and gold speculation. Mathews, supra
note 145, ("The current wave of executions is a revival of the tougher and more public means of
justice of the 1950's."); S. LENG & H. CHIU, supra note 52, at 132.
157. In the first half of 1980 alone, China's chief prosecutor reported that the police had
arrested 84,000 criminals, more than half for "grave crimes," alluding to murder and rape. F.
BUTTERFIELD, CHINA: ALIVE IN THE BITTER SEA 361 (1982).
158. Wren, Crime and Capital Punishment in China, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1983, at E9.
159. AI-1984, supra note 7, at 55.
160. Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), Jan. 18, 1984, in FBIS, Jan. 19, 1984, at K-14.
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others had been executed in the more remote city of Guiyang. 16 1 The
rate of executions reported during this time was the highest in China
since the early 1970's.162 Between 1983 and 1986, Western estimates
of the number of executions ranged from 7,000 to as many as
14,000.163
A substantial drop in the number of crimes during the first six
months of 1986 was announced in early 1987,164 reportedly as a result
of the successfully waged anti-crime campaign. Politburo member
Peng Zhen, in an address of March 31, 1987, attributed this improve-
ment to the policy of "striking ruthless blows" that had been carried
out since 1983. He found that severe punishment had deterred
criminals and returned public order to society. 65 While the anti-
crime campaign continued in 1987, it was carried out less intensively
than in the previous year.
166
During the first half of 1988, however, serious crime increased
thirty-five percent over the same six-month period in 1987.167 The
government's response in controlling this disorder was an uncompro-
mising policy of severe punishment, including the continued conven-
ing of large "mass sentencing rallies"'168 and frequent use of the death
penalty. 1
69
The question of whether China's public and frequent use of the
death penalty constitutes a more effective deterrent than other forms
of punishment, such as life imprisonment, has been left unanswered
due to the unavailability of statistics and the political sensitivity of
161. Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), Jan. 4, 1984, in FBIS, Jan. 4, 1984, at Q-1.
162. AI-1984, supra note 7, at 55.
163. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1986, 687
(1987).
164. See Beijing Chief Procurator's Work Report, Beijing Ribao, Mar. 23, 1987 (FBIS trans.
April 24, 1987, at R-1).
165. Speaking before the National Forum on Political and Judicial Work on March 31, 1987,
Peng Zhen applauded the success of the "striking ruthless blows" policy of more than three
years:
In the second year after the "striking ruthless blows" policy was implemented, wherever
I went, I used to ask people whether women comrades had to be escorted when they went
for night shift work. Many people said it was not necessary to do so. This shows that the
intolerable arrogance of criminals has been repelled and the situation in public order has
taken a favorable turn.
Peng Zhen Views Political, Judicial Work, HONGQI (Beijing), May 1, 1987 (FBIS trans. May 13,
1987, at K-1-4).
166. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987, 661
(1988).
167. Cheung, Crackdown on Crime, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Nov. 3, 1988, at 23.
168. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1988, 765
(1989).
169. Cheung, supra note 167.
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researching the Party's criminal justice policy. Presently, no studies
or reports are available in China that indicate whether the death pen-
alty has effectively deterred criminal activity. t70 The available evi-
dence in other countries still does not sufficiently show that the
increased use of the death penalty has reduced the rate of criminal
offenses. 171
B. The Question of Retribution
Retributive justice has also been one of the primary purposes for
China's frequent use of the death penalty. According to this theory,
the crime itself justifies the punishment, and the punishment is in-
tended solely to be imposed as the legal consequence of guilt. ' 72 Retri-
bution is irrelevant to the utilitarian question of whether the death
penalty serves as a deterrent. Instead, the retributivist focuses on the
issue of whether justice permits or even requires the death penalty.t 73
1. Vengeance and Anger
One justification for retribution that the Chinese criminal justice
system has consistently advanced is the demand for vengeance. This
aim of punishment is backward-looking to the offense rather than for-
ward-looking to the offender. Vengeance is punitive rather than pre-
ventative; its purpose is to express anger at the wrongdoer, regardless
of any social justification for punishment.1 74 The Chinese use of the
death sentence, when viewed through its highly publicized process of
public trial, parade, and execution, is said to serve as an outlet for
popular cries of revenge and outrage.
175
170. See Note, The Death Penalty and Legal Reform, supra note 62, at 325.
171. See, e.g., S. NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE: THE MORALITY OF PUNISHING BY
DEATH 21 (1987) ("[W]e cannot conclude that a penalty has worked simply because the actions
it seeks to prohibit decline when it is imposed. Other factors may have led to the decline."); see
also E. VAN DEN HAAG & J. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE 87 (1983) ("Specula-
tions on the proper amount of punishment to inflict so that the maximum amount of crime can
be deterred.. are not open to conclusive scientific investigation.").
172. See E. VAN DEN HAAG & J. CONRAD, supra note 171, at 19.
173. See W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 8 (1979) (The death penalty presents a
means of paying back the offenders.).
174. Jan Gorecki has explained how the emotions of hate, hostility, and outrage underlie use
of the death penalty.
Anger, fear, and the resulting hatred of the wrongdoer do not necessarily stimulate the idea
of the general moral education; they rather arouse the wish to deter strongly or to take
revenge. Consequently, they spur requests for severe, rather than merely certain and just,
punishments, and especially, for capital punishment - the severity increases deterrence and
makes revenge sweeter.
J. GORECKI, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION 119 (1983).
175. One popular Chinese idiom reflecting the role of anger in punishment is min fen nan
ping, literally meaning "popular indignation is difficult to calm." Another saying was often used
by the students in Tiananmen Square during the spring of 1989, as they awaited the eventual
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As early as 1926, when peasant associations first sprouted through-
out the countryside and assumed responsibility for the settling of local
disputes among the peasants, village leaders employed various means
to punish counterrevolutionaries. These methods included humiliat-
ing parades of the accused donning tall dunce caps, struggle sessions,
imprisonment, and execution - which Mao Zedong justified in Febru-
ary, 1927 as "meted out to the biggest of the local bullies and evil
gentry by request of the peasants and the people as a whole." In light
of all the peasant suffering, Mao viewed the wave of landlord execu-
tions as an expression of revolutionary justice: "[H]ow can one say
that the peasants should not now rise and shoot one or two of them
and bring about a small-scale reign of terror in suppressing the
counterrevolutionaries?" 
76
The revenge motive surfaced again in the pre-1949 enforcement of
land reform and punishment of "despots" and counterrevolutionaries
through mass trials, struggle meetings, and accusation rallies. One
district in the north of Jiangsu province reportedly organized more
than 12,000 "anti-traitor" and "anti-despot" meetings involving some
two million people. 77 These mass trials and meetings often ended in
violence or terror, with the accused sometimes being beaten or killed
by enraged "victims." In other cases, they were sentenced to death
and executed on the spot. The bloodshed became so excessive that
Mao admitted in a speech of April, 1948, that not only had landlords
and rich peasants been unnecessarily killed but many workers had also
been killed by rural-peasants seeking revenge.' 78
The tone of criminal sentencing in post-1949 China continues to
reveal hostility and vengeance directed at opponents of socialism
rather than any professed concern to reform the deviant.'7 9 In fre-
quently imposing the death penalty, the Chinese Communist authori-
ties often claimed that their sentencing was in response to min-fen, or
"popular anger." This acknowledgment represents a recognition on
government response: qiu hou suan zhang, literally meaning "to settle accounts after the har-
vest." The actual meaning is "to take vengeance when the time is ripe."
176. Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan (1927), translated in S.
SCHRAM, supra note 139, at 257.
177. S. LENG, supra note 46, at 21.
178. Id.
179. Many commentators have written about the importance that the Chinese criminal pro-
cess places upon reform and rehabilitation of the offender to enable him to contribute to socialist
development. Jean Pasqualini, for example, spent eight years in a Chinese labor camp and noted,
"Not only is the society within the camps in many ways purer than the larger one outside, but it
is also freer. It is in the prisons and camps that the notions of friendship and personal freedom
are the most highly developed in China." J. PASQUALINI, PRISONER OF MAO 12 (1973); see
generally A. & A. RICKETT, PRISONERS OF LIBERATION (1973).
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the part of the leadership that harsh sanctions could legitimately be
justified as necessary to assuage the anger of the people.' 80 Thus, of-
fenders received the death sentence in cases where the court stated
that "the people are extremely indignant."'8 " Such pronouncements
have taken place even in adultery cases, where the disruption of social
relations has been deemed sufficiently great to merit the harshest pun-
ishment.18 2 In other cases where the court declared that the people
are merely "very indignant," the sentence is life or long
imprisonment. '8
3
For important politically sensitive cases, however, the public was
usually provided with brief, conclusive materials referring to the
charges as "arousing the great anger of the masses" or "viciously at-
tacking socialism."'' 8 4 This style of pre-rehearsed justice caused some
observers to regard the widely-publicized "show trial" of the Gang of
Four as representing more an act of revenge on the part of Cultural
Revolution victims and an attempt at popular catharsis than any cred-
ible attempt to reach a fair outcome. 85
2. Just Requital
The principle behind just requital is that reciprocation for moral
evil voluntarily done is, in and of itself, just or morally good.'8 6 In
imperial China, just requital was used to redress violations of the so-
180. Cohen, Criminal Law, supra note 73, at 323, 342 (1977) (The authorities' justification of
the death penalty as a response to min-fen was "an explicit recognition of the legitimacy of
providing an outlet for the spirit of vengeance aroused by the most heinous crimes.").
181. A 1983 decree providing for speedier trials in cases arousing "great popular indigna-
tion" was apparently invoked in December, 1985, when an off-duty deckhand was sentenced to
death for having provoked a drunken brawl aboard a ferry crossing the Songhua River in the
Manchurian city of Harbin. The ferry was greatly overloaded, and the mob of passengers crowd-
ing for a view of the fight caused it to capsize, killing 158 persons. Bums, When Peking Fights
Crime, supra note 134, at 2 ("At times, the decision to impose the death penalty appears to have
less to do with the severity of the crimes than with the need to placate public opinion or find a
scapegoat.").
182. For example, the head of one commune brigade team was sentenced to immediate death
for raping young women. This "incorrigible hooligan" committed "extremely evil crimes and
the people are extremely indignant." This case and other death penalty sentences are included in
a document announcing the names and sentences of twenty-nine persons sentenced by the
Tianjin Intermediate People's Court on August 5, 1973. Edwards, supra note 142, at 59, 72, 77-
78 (1977).
183. Id. at 59.
184. S. LENG & H. CHIu, supra note 52, at 24.
185. See Butterfield, Revenge Seems to Outweigh Justice at Chinese Trial, N.Y. Times, Dec.
6, 1980, at 2 ("The trial so far seems more an act of vengeance by the victims of the Cultural
Revolution than a careful attempt to trace responsibility for the persecutions and dislocations of
that period.").
186. T. SORELL, MORAL THEORY AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 147 (1987) [hereinafter T.
SORELL].
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cial order caused by improper individual acts or criminal violence. 187
The magistrate dutifully dispensed retributive punishment for distur-
bance of the natural harmony that existed between the affairs of his
district and the will of Heaven. The severity of the punishment was
supposed to correspond exactly to the disruption of the natural or-
der.188 Resonating with the notion that a punishment should match
the seriousness of the violation to the natural order, death by slicing
was reserved for only the most heinous crimes such as high treason,
rebellion, murder of the husband, patricide, mutilation of a living per-
son, witchcraft, and other offenses collectively known as the "Ten
Abominations." 1
89
The Qing Code contained various life-for-a-life provisions for cer-
tain kinds of homicide. 190 In one case involving a common man's
unsuccessfully attempted killing of a slave, the Board of Punishments
pronounced a judgment of life exile. 191 Had death resulted, however,
the Board reasoned that death by strangulation would have been the
standard penalty required under the Code. The Board of Punishment
wrote: "[F]or any destruction of a human life there has to be proper
requital."' 192 This statement reflected the ancient idea that a homicide
upsets the cosmic order, the restoration of which required that a life be
given as requital for the life taken away. 193 It also resonated of the
Yuan dynasty's 194 imposition of retaliatory punishment, or the taking
of retribution proportional to the degree of injury suffered by the
offender. 195
The 1935 Criminal Code promulgated by the Guomindang refined
earlier similar codes and was intended to inflict on the criminal a pun-
ishment proportional to the particular social danger he had caused.1
96
While the Criminal Code vested judges with considerable discretion in
selecting a criminal sentence from a range of maximum to minimum
187. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 43.
188. M. MEIJER, supra note 32, at 32.
189. See D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 93.
190. The Code applies the terms di or di ming, literally "requiting a life," signifying the type
of homicide for which another must be given in requital. Id. at 182.
191. Hsing-an Hui-lan 17.39/la, case 185.1, 1806, reprinted in id. at 374.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 374-75.
194. 1271-1368.
195. P. CH'EN, CHINESE LEGAL TRADITION UNDER THE MONGOLS: THE CODE OF 1291 AS
RECONSTRUCTED 61-62 (1979) [hereinafter P. CH'EN]. Paul Ch'en notes that the notion of retal-
iatory punishment was understood by ancient Chinese thinkers such as Mencius, who once said:
"When a man kills another's father, that other will kill his father; when a man kills another's
brother, that other will kill his elder brother."
196. J. ESCARRA, supra note 39, at 315.
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punishments, some life-for-life provisions still existed. 197 For example,
the killing of the Chief Executive of a friendly state1 98 or of one's lineal
ascendants both carried the death sentence. 199
The Chinese Communist rule has continued the pattern of justify-
ing capital punishment in terms of social fairness or justness. "A life
for a life" remains a popular notion of fair punishment. 20° The leading
criminal law text produced by the leadership in 1957 explained, "To
use the death penalty is not only necessary but also just.
'
"201
Other countries have determined that retributive justice does not
require the death penalty in order to maintain its utility of credibility.
Nearly all the European countries, except for the Soviet Union 20 2 and
some of its satellites, have rejected the notion of death as the penalty
for murder.20 3 United States Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall wrote that retribution was the equivalent of vengeance and
hence, an improper goal of the state. In many instances, he wrote,
long imprisonment can satisfy the demands of retributive justice for a
proportional punishment. Once the punishment lapses into vengeance
or mere retaliation, however, the outcome hinges upon the emotional
sensibilities of the victimized community. Thereby lacking valid and
objective purpose, the penalty of death was excessively cruel.
2°4
IV. INDIGENOUS TRADITIONS AND THE DEATH PENALTY
A. The Penchant for Hierarchy: Judicial Review of Death Sentences
China has historically relied on its massive, hierarchical bureau-
cracy to administer justice and implement the criminal law. The tradi-
tional Chinese philosophy instructed that hierarchy was
cosmologically natural, just as man and nature were intrinsically
linked in a state of equilibrium. Injustices of any kind disrupted the
197. See J. Wu, supra note 37, at 55-56.
198. 1923 PROVISIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 5, art. 121.
199. Id. arts. 312, 314.
200. Edwards, Civil and Social Rights: Theory and Practice in Chinese Law Today, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 54 (R. Edwards, L. Henkin, & A. Nathan eds.
1986) [hereinafter Edwards, Civil and Social Rights].
201. J. COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 536 (emphasis added).
202. Even the Soviet Union has begun to reexamine its position towards the death penalty.
Policies of leniency have begun to gain ground; a 1988 draft for the new criminal code includes a
substantial reduction in the number of capital offenses. While the eventual abolition of the death
penalty is envisaged by the draft, the penalty is to be retained for treachery, terrorism, espionage,
subversion and heinous crimes of premeditated murder and the rape of juveniles. Dejevsky,
Kremlin Moves Towards Death Penalty Abolition, The Times (London), Dec. 19, 1988, at 1.
203. T. SORELL, supra note 186, at 24.
204. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall found retribution to be an illegitimate
goal in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 342-45 (1972) (concurring).
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natural order and needed to be redressed in order to restore the equi-
librium. With regard to capital cases, therefore, the procedure for re-
view was quite elaborate and hierarchically organized. Chinese law
insisted on close scrutiny of every capital case at the highest level
before life could be taken.205 Ultimate judgments upon capital cases
required final ratification by the Emperor himself. While previous
Chinese dynasties had recognized the importance of this system of re-
view, it was not until the Qing that the appellate system developed into
its most sophisticated form.
20 6
Under the Manchu state, the xian, or "county," magistrate served
as the judge of the court of first instance. 20 7 Responsible for the main-
tenance of law and order in his local district, he was the lowest official
in the hierarchy of the imperial government's territorial network of
authority. He was scholar, literati, administrator, tax collector, trans-
mitter and implementer of official dicta, and arbiter. Although not a
judge trained in law, 20 8 the xian magistrate played a vital position in
the imperial judicial system by deciding which cases to accept or reject
for trial. Yet, on the whole, magistrates were usually inexperienced,
20 9
overworked, 210 and harassed by legal deadlines for apprehending and
convicting criminals. 211 Frequently unable to speak the local dialects,
they depended on locally hired staff which was often corrupt and op-
portunistic. 212 Constables,213 for instance, sometimes arrested the
wrong persons and then extracted false confessions through torture in
order to receive the official reward for arresting suspects who were
205. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 131.
206. Ocko, I'll Take It All the Way to Beiing: Capital Appeals in the Qing 47 J. ASIAN
STUDIES 291 (1988) (arguing that the Qin legal system had acknowledged the right of appeal for
a new trial, the early Han system imposed a mandatory review by the imperial court for the
difficult cases, and the Sui permitted victims of injustice to bring their cases to the capital in the
hope that the emperor might listen to their complaints); see also P. CH'EN, supra note 195, at 79-
80 (noting that the Yuan dynasty had a mandatory review system, requiring that every capital
offense case be submitted to the more experienced officials of the central government for final
approval of punishment).
207. See infra text accompanying note 23.
208. See J. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 6. The xian magistrate could
more aptly be characterized as an administrator steeped in Confucian classics and morality. This
moral education, however, did not prevent many from being cruel, corrupt, and arbitrary.
209. About half of the magistrates arrived in office without prior administrative experience.
J. WATr, supra note 23, at 57.
210. See, e.g., Kim & LeBlang, supra note 81, at 77, 97-98.
211. J. COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 6.
212. See id.; see also R. VAN GULIK, supra note 78, at 59, where it is noted that lower court
personnel were locally recruited and thus were often biased towards serving their own interests
and those of the local elite.
213. These agents of the magistrate, armed during court proceedings with the terrifying para-
phernalia of the cangue, manacles and fetters, were generally feared and despised by the people.
R. VAN GULIK, supra note 78, at 55.
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subsequently convicted. 214
Under the Qing dynasty system of review, the seriousness of a case,
and especially the severity of the sentence, determined whether the
case was subject to mandatory review. The severest penalties (in ex-
cess of the cangue) required approval by higher authorities.215 After
conducting the trial and pronouncing his provisional sentence, the
magistrate then forwarded the criminal, witness, and case records to
the prefect. He reviewed the trial transcript, questioned the accused,
and then transferred the recorded materials to the judicial commis-
sioner and governor who in turn made their deliberations. Death
sentences, constituting the most severe form of sentencing, had to be
reviewed by the highest judicial organ in the capital, the Board of Pun-
ishment. Only the Emperor himself could sanction executions, and
even then only after careful review (except in cases of summary execu-
tion). In such instances, a memorial containing the facts of the case
was prepared and sent to the Emperor for endorsement. 216 The Em-
peror routinely endorsed judgments in the form of a confirmatory re-
script, although he could always disapprove, in which case he would
return a rescript of disapproval.
The Qing judicial structure, with its well-defined delegation of ju-
dicial authority at different levels of government, sought to extend ef-
fective protection to the people and limit the danger of abuse of power.
Since death penalty offenses were entitled to a mandatory review by
more experienced officials at higher levels of government, suspects
were more likely to secure a just trial than under previous dynasties.
The Qing review and appellate process, however, became increasingly
overwhelmed by the growing burden of reviews and appeals, in good
part due to the eighteenth-century population explosion and the conse-
quent demands it imposed on the judicial system.2 17
The new Republic that succeeded the Qing promised to overturn
the bureaucratic corruption of the dynasty's legal system. It an-
nounced its intentions to modernize the law and build a specialized
professional judiciary. Despite the promulgation of new regulations
requiring judges to complete university legal training and pass a na-
tional law examination, however, the rhetoric of reform produced few
tangible results. Many judges were granted exemptions from these
new requirements by high government officials, and many other mag-
214. Kim & LeBlang, supra note 81, at 97-98.
215. The following description of the review process is based on the description in Ocko,
supra note 206, at 292-93.
216. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 133.
217. Ocko, supra note 206, at 310.
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istrates ignored the new laws and remained on the job.218 In addition,
most judges were selected from military tribunals that retained strong
loyalties to local warlords and generals.
219
The great ambitions of the Guomindang leadership to modernize
the legal system similarly dissipated, in part due to the resiliency of
corruption, old loyalties, and ineffective training programs, and in part
due to the mounting external pressures on the ruling regime.
Although it established an independent judicial hierarchy composed of
district courts, high courts, and the Supreme Court, the Nationalist
regime lacked judges with formal legal training and, therefore, was
forced to rely on retired officials or soldiers. The Western-oriented
legal structure existed only in theory; in practice, power had devolved
into the hands of the local elite.
Although the Communists formally abolished the Nationalist legal
structure upon assuming power in 1949, a shortage in trained legal
personnel forced them to retain many of the Nationalist judicial and
police organs, as well as personnel who had specialized training.220 In
the 1950's, legal education was neglected and shunned, remaining vir-
tually non-existent for the next two decades.221 The disruptions of the
Cultural Revolution contributed in large part to the present shortage
of qualified judicial personnel. The revival of legal education in the
late 1970's,222 however, began to rebuild the student legal corps, so
that by 1983, some 13,000 full-time law students were studying in
twenty-six university law departments and three institutes of political
science and law.2 23 By 1987, there were thirty-five law departments at
universities, one political-legal university, and four political-legal insti-
tutes with a total enrollment of more than 25,000 students.224 At that
same time, some 3,435 courts had been established employing 195,000
court workers, 225 and 20,000 lawyers had been registered.
226
218. J. BRADY, supra note 40, at 49. Brady indicates that in Hainan province, ten percent of
the judges were given special exemptions, and another sixty percent ignored the new regulations.
219. Id.
220. Li, Book Review, supra note 11, at 187.
221. Jerome Cohen found during his visit to China in 1972 that "the first thing to understand
about legal education in China today is that there isn't any." Cohen, Notes on Legal Education
in China, 4 LAWASIA 205 (1973).
222. See, e.g., Gelatt & Snyder, Legal Education In China: Training for a New Era, I CHINA
L. REP. 41 (1980).
223. Cohen, Rebuilding China's Shattered Legal System, 6 ASIA 14, 16 (Nov./Dec. 1983).
224. Leng, Legal Reform in Post-Mao China, supra note 64, at 215.
225. Supreme Court President Gives Report to N.PC., Beijing Xinhua, Apr. 2, 1988, in FBIS
Apr. 4, 1987, at 17 [hereinafter Supreme Court NPC. Report].
226. New Justice Minister Discusses Legal Services, Beijing Xinhua, Apr. 14, 1988, in FBIS
Apr. 15, 1988, at 19.
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The shortage of personnel trained in the administration of law dur-
ing the post-Mao era has encouraged continued reliance on policy as a
guide for legal adjudicators. Simply stated, there are not enough
courts, lawyers, and judges to go around.227 These shortages, coupled
with the Party's ideological demands, have failed to insulate legal ad-
judicators from Party controls in cases of a political nature. Without
clear guidelines for defining non-political cases, virtually any case is
susceptible to Party interference. 228 It remains to be seen whether suf-
ficient pressure can be mobilized to prevent local Party secretaries
from interfering with the judicial decision-making process even in
those cases of a clearly political nature.
Theoretically, reform of the appellate review process for death
sentences has encouraged greater judicial protection of the defendant.
The Law of Criminal Procedure provided for mandatory review by the
Supreme People's Court of all death sentences, whether or not ap-
pealed by the defendant. 229 The accused was also given the right to
one appeal within ten days of the conviction. 230 This process was
streamlined, however, when the Standing Committee of the Fifth Na-
tional People's Congress in June, 1981, passed a provisional resolution
modifying articles 144 and 145 of the Criminal Procedure Law. 231
The new resolution allowed the Supreme People's Court to delegate
the right to approve death sentences for murder, robbery, rape, bomb-
ing, arson, and sabotage to the high courts at the provincial or
equivalent level. 232 This guarantee of mandatory review for death
sentences by other high courts, however, was occasionally disre-
garded.233 In September, 1983, the Standing Committee of the Sixth
National People's Congress incorporated the new resolution into an
amendment to article 13 of the Organic Law of the People's Courts.
234
In addition, the Standing Committee also decided to reduce the time
227. Note, Concepts of Law, supra note 60, at 1903.
228. The drafters of the Constitution deliberately hedged on the question of the relationship
between the Communist Party and the courts. See Lubman, Western Scholarship, supra note 64,
at 94.
229. Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, arts. 144, 145.
230. Id. arts. 129, 131.
231. See Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding
the Question of Approval of Cases Involving Death Sentences (adopted June 10, 1981), in CRIMI-
NAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW, supra note 6, at 217 [hereinafter NPC Death
Sentence Decision].
232. Death sentences rendered for counterrevolutionary crimes and embezzlement still re-
quire approval by the Supreme People's Court. Id. at 218.
233. See Woo, The Right to a Criminal Appeal in the People's Republic of China, 14 YALE J.
INT'L L. 118, 147 n.187 (1989) (citing cases where the accused was executed solely on the basis of
a lower court's decision).
234. NPC Death Sentence Decision, supra note 231, at 218.
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limit for requests for appeals from ten to three days. 235 Sentences were
rarely changed on appeal, however, and the trend has been towards
further curtailing review, 236 especially as the growth of litigation in-
creasingly burdens the courts. The result of these legislative changes
has been to expedite the whole process of arrest to appeal to
execution. 2
37
The effective functioning of the review apparatus in China's crimi-
nal justice system is closely linked to the available pool of qualified
political-legal cadres. While efforts to staff the courts and raise the
technical expertise of judges have progressed, the judiciary still suffers
from a lack of sufficient personnel, funding, and training materials. 238
Until these problems are addressed, the Chinese legal system will en-
counter continued difficulty in handling cases carefully and in con-
formity with the standards set by a hierarchical system of review.
B. Unequal Before the Law: Privilege for the Chinese Elite
Favoritism toward officials in the Chinese courts, as in the form of
dismissed claims and lenient treatment, has also been a longstanding
tradition of the Chinese legal system. The imperial codes recognized
entire categories of persons as deserving of special judicial procedural
status, differentiating and elevating them from the general popula-
tion.239 While the groups that qualified for consideration included
those linked to the imperial family, the most significant category was
that of high officials and their immediate families. 240 The general
population, knowing little or nothing about the law and rarely in-
volved with legal matters, had no remedy against improper official acts
except for employing extralegal methods of obtaining relief.24'
Although the scope of privilege varied from dynasty to dynasty, its
essence was that high officials and their immediate family members
235. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding the
Procedure for Rapid Adjudication of Cases Involving Criminal Elements Who Seriously Endan-
ger Public Security (adopted Sept. 2, 1983), in CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
LAW, supra note 6, at 246.
236. AI-1984, supra note 7, at 68.
237. Summary executions without procedural protections were increasingly common during
anti-crime campaigns. See S. LENG & H. CHIU, supra note 52, at 134-36; Note, The Death
Penalty and Legal Reform, supra note 62, at 318; see also Woo, supra note 233, at 146.
238. See, e.g., Lubman, Emerging Functions of Formal Legal Institutions in China's Moderni-
zation, 2 CHINA L. REP. 195, 206 (1983); see also Supreme Court N.P.C Report, supra note 225,
at 18.
239. In the code of the Manchu dynasty, for instance, special articles conferred a privileged
position upon offending public officers and princes, among others. M. VAN DER VALK, INTER-
PRETATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT AT PEKING: YEARS 1915 AND 1916, at 28 (1968).
240. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 34.
241. Li, Book Review, supra note 11, at 207.
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could not be investigated, arrested, or tortured without the approval of
the Emperor himself; that guilty sdntences were subject to considera-
tion by the Emperor for possible mitigation; and that the usual
sentences to the common people (including death) were for the offi-
cials often commutable to monetary fines, demotion in official rank, or
dismissal from the civil service. 242 The imperial tendency to separate
the general populace from the ruling elite reflected not merely a pro-
tective self-interest, but also the notion that such a distinction main-
tained the power of the state and facilitated social and cosmological
harmony.
Privilege during imperial China, however, also had its price. Offi-
cials had to meet higher expectations, and although different standards
applied when these expectations were not fulfilled, punishments were
severe and offenders held up to censure. Officials who violated the
sumptuary regulations, for instance, were punished according to the
Qing Code by 100 blows of the heavy bamboo, while a non-official
violator would only receive fifty. 243
Throughout the forty years of Chinese Communist rule, govern-
ment, Party, and military personnel who violated regulations have
been sentenced less severely than the general population for political
and public order offenses.244 Not until the early 1980s and the govern-
ment's crackdown on crime and nepotism, however, did Chinese au-
thorities begin to depart from the traditional practice of allowing
privilege to reduce criminal sentences. Executions of public officials
not only represented a sharp break from the past,245 but also dramati-
cally symbolized the leadership's desire to implement legal reform.
The 1982 Constitution, unlike the 1975 and 1978 versions, proclaimed
the equality of all Chinese citizens before the law. 246 People's Daily
editorials exhorted Party and government officials to adhere to the
principle that all people, regardless of political status, are legally
equal. 247 The anticrime campaigns, which included drives against eco-
242. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 34-35.
243. Id. at 35.
244. Yuan-li Wu has used reports from the Chinese news media for the 1949-1984 period to
analyze statistically the judicial practice and the human rights conditions in the People's Repub-
lic of China. For his conclusions on the role of privilege, see Wu, A Statistical Analysis (Appendix
A), in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 314-15 (1988).
245. Yuan-li Wu concludes that the ratio of economic offenses committed by privileged em-
ployees to the general population was considerably higher during the period of Deng's economic
reforms of 1979-1984 than during the Party's more "normal" years of 1952-1957. Id. at 315.
246. P.R.C. CONSTITUTION, supra note 59, art. 33.
247. See, e.g., Economic Criminals Must Be Punished 'Severely.' Beijing Remnin Ribao, Sept.
15, 1983 (FBIS trans. Sept. 20, 1983, at K-6). One commentary of September 15, 1983 urged:
When cadres commit crimes they must be punished according to law regardless of their
level. Their sons and daughters are no exception. Anyone trying to place obstacles or to
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nomic crimes and violent crimes, did not spare cadres and their family
members. 248 The late General Zhu*De's grandson was executed in
Tianjin in September, 1983, reportedly for being a gang leader and a
rapist.249 The grandnephew of former President Li Xiannian was also
executed about the same time in the northern city of Xian for murder
and rape.2
50
In January, 1986, the government began a campaign against cor-
ruption within the Chinese Communist Party, with the press warning
that senior cadres and their offspring would not be exempt from pun-
ishment. The last time that leading party officials were legally exe-
cuted dated back to the early 1950s, when senior party officials were
executed at the start of the Five-Anti Campaign.25t In February, two
children of senior party officials in Shanghai were executed after hav-
ing been convicted on multiple rape charges.252 More than a year
later, another Party cadre was executed after having been convicted of
raping fourteen young women since 1977.253 Rape has been one of the
most common abuses of power by party cadres.
254
With the growing importance given economic reform and modern-
ization, the authorities have become increasingly attentive towards the
economic crimes of public officials, including embezzlement, bribery,
and corruption. 255 Deng Xiaoping, in an address before the Politburo
harbor evildoers must also be dealt with according to party discipline and state law. Under
no circumstances must we tolerate him.
248. More than 500,000 Party members were arrested or disciplined between 1981 and 1986.
Note, The Death Penalty and Legal Reform, supra note 62, at 321.
249. S. LENG & H. CHIU, supra note 52, at 142; see also, Beijing Mayor Confirms Execution
ofZhu De's Grandson, Hsin Pao (Hong Kong), Nov. 30, 1983, (FBIS trans. Dec. 1, 1983, at W-
3-4), where Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong confirmed news of the execution to a reporter in New
York: "At present, in China, all people are equal before the law."
250. Lee, Death of the Tigers, FAR EASTERN EcON. REV., Mar. 6, 1986, at 34.
251. The Five-Anti Campaign of 1951-52 targeted capitalist bribery of government workers,
tax evasion, theft of state assets, cheating on government contracts, and stealing of state eco-
nomic intelligence. References of the Chinese government in 1986 to that movement fueled spec-
ulation that major cases were pending against individuals involved in scandals related to the
"open door" economic policy. Burns, Peking Focuses on Execution of 3 Aides'Sons, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 25, 1986, at All.
252. The executions of these two "cubs" - sons of senior party officials - were the first
such executions to be announced publicly. They were perceived to send a clear signal that the
leadership was seriously tackling the problem of abuse of power. Id.; see also Southerland, Cad-
res'Sons Executed in China, Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 1986, at A21 ("Official press reports indicated
that the executions were aimed in part at countering the widespread perception that the country's
laws are designed only for ordinary citizens and that Communist Party officials and their rela-
tives are above the law.").
253. CPC Cadre Accused of Rape Executed, Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), Jan. 5,
1988, in FBIS Jan. 5, 1988, at 19.
254. The deeply-rooted prejudice against rape victims and a lack of legal recourse have pro-
tected rapists in the past. Id.
255. The statement by Hu Qili, a member of China's Communist Party Politburo, that those
who "deserve to be killed should be killed," was regarded by observers as the most explicit
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in January, 1986, said that he favored the death penalty for corrupt
officials responsible for heavy financial losses to the state.256 In Sep-
tember, 1986, the former deputy secretary of the Hexian County
(Guangxi) Party Committee was sentenced to death for accepting
bribes and embezzling more than 190,000 yuan of public funds. 257
The following April, an official of the Visa Department of the Foshan
Public Security Bureau was given the death penalty for accepting
bribes. 258 The local newspaper soon thereafter commented that the
execution should deter other cadres from participating in corrupt
activities.
25 9
China's historical legacy of privilege, however, still burdens efforts
to reform and regularize the legal system. Some observers have noted
that the campaign against corruption and other economic crimes has
"only struck flies but not tigers."'260 To date, only mid-rank cadres
have been punished; no high officials have ever been criminally prose-
cuted and sentenced for their offenses. 261 In a highly publicized case
of 1986, Ye Zhifeng, deputy director of the State Economic Commis-
sion's Export-Import Bureau, was convicted of selling confidential in-
formation concerning national commercial policy to foreign
businessmen. She also was the daughter of General Yeh Fei, the Vice
Chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee.
While her accomplice received the death penalty, Yeh Zhifeng was
sentenced to just six years' imprisonment, even though she was the
principal offender in the case. Not only has this case been severely
criticized within China, but it has also called into question the credi-
bility of China's new legal reforms with respect to judicial indepen-
dence and equality before the law. 262
warning to date that high-ranking officials could be subjected to the death penalty if convicted of
economic crimes as part of the drive against corruption. Southerland, China Warns on Economic
Crimes, Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1986, at A20.
256. Report on Executions, Law, Order Measures, Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), Jan.
5, 1988, in FBIS, Jan. 7, 1988, at 19.
257. Guangxi Official to be Executed for Corruption, Nanning Guangxi Regional Service,
Sept. 25, 1986 in FBIS trans. Sept. 26, 1986, at P-1. The report concluded that the severity of the
punishment "has evoked strong repercussions among cadres and the masses. Many people be-
lieved that the judgment of this major case indicates that everybody has to answer to the law
258. Guandong's Foshan City Executes Corrupt Official, supra note 154.
259. Id. at P-l-2.
260. Leng, Legal Reform in Post-Mao China, supra note 64, at 224.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 224-25; see also, Cheng Ming Details Crimes of CPC Cadre Families, Hong
Kong Cheng Ming, May 1, 1986 (FBIS trans. May 14, 1986, at W-3-5).
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C. The Concept of Amnesty: The Two-Year Suspended
Death Sentence
Any account detailing the severity of China's criminal death pen-
alty needs to be balanced by a discussion of the enduring concept of
amnesty that the ruling leaders have adopted to soften the sharp edge
of harsh criminal punishment. The world of traditional China, after
all, seems to have been one of brutal punishment where the death pen-
alty was easily invoked and rarely challenged. Yet in practice, the
concept of amnesty occasionally prevailed.
263
For more than two thousand years, the concept of "natural har-
mony" 264 influenced Chinese attitudes towards harsh legal rulings, es-
pecially in the specific timing for carrying out death sentences.
Executions were carried out only in the autumn and winter, which
were regarded as seasons of destruction and death, rather than in the
growing seasons of spring and summer.265 In addition, executions
were prohibited on many other days of the year, including the winter
solstice and equinoxes, days of fasting and sacrifice, and specific events
such as the accession of a new ruler. The days remaining open for
executions actually totalled less than two months of the year.266 Not
until the Qing Code of 1740 were the taboo periods significantly re-
duced, in part reflecting the weakening of belief in the doctrine of cos-
mic harmony.2
67
Once a condemned person had survived into the spring, he was
entitled to a stay of execution until the following season of executions,
and in the meantime, he could hope for a commutation of sentence. In
some instances, he might be granted a pardon, in others a lesser pen-
alty, such as banishment for life, or even military service for life.
Thus, in many ways the harsher aspects of the law were softened by
strong humanitarian impulses. The commutation of executions also
often resulted from the sophisticated and hierarchical system of judi-
cial review that was inspired by Confucian teachings. 268 One Chinese
account indicates that no more than ten percent of those offenders sen-
263. See generally B. MCKNIGHT, THE QUALITY OF MERCY: AMNESTIES AND TRADI-
TIONAL CHINESE JUSTICE (1981) (describing the system of amnesties that existed during pre-
modem China).
264. According to this theory, the human and natural worlds were so closely entwined
through various relationships that any disturbance in one would cause a corresponding distur-
bance in the other. This doctrine of oneness between man and nature premised that man should
adapt his institutions to the movements of nature. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 44.
265. Id. at 45.
266. Id. at 46-47.
267. Id. at 47-48.
268. See text accompanying notes 205-17, infra.
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tenced to death were actually executed. 269
One of the most important changes in the criminal code that re-
placed the old imperial code in the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury was the new section on discretionary reduction of capital
punishment. Under the new law, the judge was empowered to choose
the proper punishment to be inflicted, between fixed maximum and
minimum limits, except in the most heinous cases such as regicide or
patricide.270 The judge was granted special discretion to reduce the
punishment by one or two degrees in extraordinary cases, taking into
consideration the offender's motives and the particular facts of the
case.271 Such reduction of punishment was deemed consistent with
China's long tradition of commuting capital punishment sentences. 272
The Communist leadership adopted the unique policy of sihuan
zhidu, "death sentence with a reprieve," which provides a legally sanc-
tioned waiting period of two years prior to execution in order to give
the condemned person sufficient time to repent and reform. 273 If the
offender demonstrates repentence over the two years, the sentence may
be commuted to life or fixed-term imprisonment. This two-year re-
prieve was codified both in the Criminal Law274 and the Law of Crimi-
nal Procedure.275 Although the standards for evaluating the offender's
behavior are not statutorily defined, the majority of two-year sus-
pended death sentence cases are commuted to life or lesser terms of
imprisonment. 276 This two-year reprieve has been applied primarily in
the case of political prisoners, the most notable whom have included
Mao Zedong's widow and one of her associates in the "Gang of
Four. '2 77 It has also been applied to young offenders in other ordi-
269. M. MEIJER, supra note 32, at 67. This estimate was made by Shen Jiaben, regarded as
the most important scholar of Chinese law, who after serving on the Board of Punishments
played a leading role in the reform of the Chinese legal system during the first decade of the
twentieth century.
270. See id. at 67-68, 74-75, 95.
271. Draft of the New Criminal Code (1907), arts. 54, 55, reprinted in id. at 74-75.
272. Id. at 67.
273. The first legal provision mentioning the two-year suspended death sentence was in the
Regulations for Dealing with Cases of Corruption, Waste, and Bureaucracy (March 8, 1952).
The reprieve was first explained in Remnin Ribao ("People's Daily") on June 1, 1951. S. LENG,
supra note 46, at 167 n.78.
274. Criminal Law, supra note 6, art. 46.
275. Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, arts. 146, 153.
276. Note, The Death Penalty and Legal Reform, supra note 62, at 314.
277. Both Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao were given suspended death sentences in 1981
following their well-publicized trial for counterrevolutionary offenses. In 1983 the Supreme Peo-
ple's Court commuted their sentences to life imprisonment. See generally D. BONAVIA, VER-
DICT IN PEKING: THE TRIAL OF THE GANG OF FOUR (1984) (using the trial transcripts to
elucidate the political workings and personalities of this "central event in the political develop-
ment of modern China"); see also A GREAT TRIAL IN CHINESE HISTORY (1981).
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nary criminal cases, 2 78 as well as pregnant women. 279
Chinese officials and jurists have cited the two-year suspended
death sentence as evidence that the underlying principle of China's
criminal law is to restrict and reduce the use of the death penalty and
to combine punishment with leniency in the spirit of revolutionary hu-
manitarianism. 280 Although they agree that retention of the death
penalty is necessary because of its deterrent value in dealing with ma-
jor counterrevolutionary crimes and other most heinous offenses, they
have stated that it should be used both reluctantly and carefully.
Toward the end of the 1955-56 campaign to suppress counter-
revolutionaries, for instance, the Communist leadership made a series
of rather remarkable statements suggesting a diminishing use and
gradual abolition of the death penalty. Mao, concerned that the
bloodshed had become excessive, in his "On the Ten Major Relation-
ships" speech of April, 1956, called for fewer arrests and executions
among ordinary persons and for "killing none and arresting few"
among Party and government members. 28' Mao offered four reasons
why executions needed to be discouraged: 1) though some executions
are justified, many yield no advantages; 2) some people may be
wrongly executed- "Once a head is chopped off, history shows it
can't be restored, nor can it grow again as chives do, after being cut";
3) executions destroy sources of potentially useful information; and 4)
killing diminishes the labor pool necessary for economic moderniza-
tion and strengthening national defense.282 Even the standard Chinese
criminal law text of 1957 expressed the expectation that the death pen-
alty would eventually be abolished. 283
The Chinese concern for the sanctity of human life, 284 however,
has not been expressed in the form of any outspoken opposition to the
death penalty. In fact, China currently has no vocal groups advocat-
ing its abolition. While Chinese leaders continue to make pronounce-
278. Criminal Law, supra note 6, art. 44.
279. Id.
280. See S. LENG & H. CHIU, supra note 52, at 109; see also the excerpt from the 1957
criminal law text in J. COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note !1, at 537.
281. See On the Ten Major Relationships (April 25, 1956), in 5 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO
TSE-TUNG 299 (1977) [hereinafter On the Ten Major Relationships]; see also Cohen, Criminal
Law, supra note 73, at 323.
282. See On the Ten Major Relationships, supra note 281, at 298-301.
283. J. COHEN, CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 536. The textbook read: "A correct
estimate of the death penalty's active role in the struggle against crime by no means implies the
need to retain the death penalty forever. On the contrary, our country is in the process of creat-
ing conditions for the gradual abolition of this penalty."
284. See Edwards, Civil and Social Rights, supra note 200, at 53 ("[C]oncern for human life
is a strong traditional Chinese value that is deeply felt by citizens and reflected in Party and state
policies.").
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ments expressing the importance of rehabilitation and cautious use of
the death penalty, 285 such official statements belie the spate of execu-
tions that have marked various anti-crime campaigns during the past
decade.
The Chinese Communists' innovation of the death sentence with
two-year reprieve reflects a traditional Chinese faith in the malleability
of man and his potential productive capacities. It also faintly echoes
the imperial Chinese rulers' longstanding use of regular amnesties that
pardoned prisoners or reduced their sentences. While abolition of the
death penalty does not appear to be part of this tradition, the sus-
pended death sentence does serve to blunt the rigidity and brutality of
criminal punishment.
CONCLUSION: CONTINUITIES AND CHANGE
A review of the Qing dynasty's often despotic, yet in some ways,
merciful approach to the death penalty offers an illustrative backdrop
to the legal reforms of the Dengist leadership, as well as the setbacks
for the role of law suffered in the aftermath of Tiananmen.
One explanation for China's evolving policies towards the death
penalty can be traced to domestic or societal factors, such as Marxist-
Leninist ideology, historical legacy, or traditional attitudes towards
the function of the criminal law. Reflecting the perceived needs of the
state, these factors have strongly influenced the state's determinations
about what type of policies would most effectively implement its de-
sired goals. The Chinese leaders annointed with the task of govern-
ance - an elite assemblage stretching from the imperial emperors to
the modern day emperors of Chiang, Mao, and Deng - have all rec-
ognized the importance of criminal punishment, including the death
penalty, as a means of social control, promoting the aims of the state,
eliminating the opposition, and deterring others. The present Dengist
leadership, whose impressive steps towards legal reform during the
past decade seemed reminiscent of the earlier Guomindang moderni-
zation efforts, has since retreated in the aftermath of Tiananmen to a
more retrenched, ideological, and politicized position.
In many ways, the government response to the 1989 student move-
ment recalls the earlier repressive episodes in Communist China's his-
tory. The harsh treatment of political prisoners, the reappearance of
285. See, e.g., Director Peng Zhen Explains Draft Laws at the NPC Plenary Session, Beijing
Xinhua, June 26, 1979, in FBIS June 27, 1979, at L-7. For instance, Peng Zhen, former mayor of
Beijing and then director of the Commission of Legislative Affairs at the National People's Con-
gress Standing Committee, said at the Fifth Congress in June, 1979, that China "cannot and
should not abolish capital punishment but will use it only when absolutely necessary."
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counterrevolutionary terminology, the public forms of humiliation,
the widespread purge of participating students and supportive officials,
the recurrence of torture and summary executions all suggest a pattern
of social control that dates back to the more doctrinaire and dogmatic
periods of Chinese Communist history. Yet, the violent forms of pun-
ishment are hardly unique to Communist China. Chiang Kai-shek
and the late Qing emperors also borrowed from traditional China's
harsh Legalist legacy, and they, too, proved unwilling to have their
authority challenged or endangered in any way.
Another explanation for the shifts in China's administration of
criminal justice and use of the the death penalty can be found in the
various external pressures impinging upon the regime's power. Such
exogenous pressures might include political or economic instability,
military threats, geographic constraints, or even international condem-
nation. These pressures often coincided with and determined changes
in China's use of the death penalty. During times of stability, China's
leadership has been more likely to lean towards a more formalized
criminal process with more lenient punishment. During periods of in-
ternal turmoil or stress, however, adherence to laws and procedures
has been undermined by the regime's need to consolidate control or
promote its political policies.
China's use of the death penalty reflects not only state ideology or
the extent to which the state perceives challenges to its power, but also
the basic aims of penological theory - those of deterrence and retri-
bution. Over the centuries, the state has exploited the deterrence func-
tion by carrying out brutal methods of execution, widely publicizing
death sentences and executions, and altering the frequency of such
sentences in order to meet its needs through campaigns or other move-
ments. The Chinese use of capital punishment has also been marked
by retribution, whether expressed through notions of vengeance and
anger or through the principle of just requital.
The continuities with the past associated With China's implemen ta-
tion of the death penalty are revealed in a number of indigenous tradi-
tions. First, China's penchant'for hierarchy, which has long been
viewed as natural and cosmological, is reflected in the intricate review
process that aimed to prevent arbitrariness and capriciousness. Sec-
ond, the concept of elite privilege has resonated throughout Chinese
history, having been both formally codified and informally observed in
the legal process. Third, the notion of amnesty, reflected 'most re-
cently in the form of the death sentence with a two-year reprieve, ex-
emplifies the Chinese faith in the re-educability of man. Deeply rooted
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in China's traditional political culture, these practices and preferences
endure, even amidst China's continued efforts at legal reform.
China's long history of arbitrary justice anticipated the events that
transpired in Tiananmen Square in June, 1989, and the harsh crack-
down on pro-democracy participants that ensued. The use of capital
punishment in a political context has been a typical pattern in the Chi-
nese criminal system for centuries, and particularly during the past
four decades under the Communist regime. Yet, until the Beijing
Spring, 1989, the legal reforms of the past decade represented a sub-
stantial improvement over the bloody years of the early 1950s, when
several hundred thousand landlords and other members of the old rul-
ing elite were shot or beaten to death without trial, and the decade-
long Cultural Revolution, which witnessed the brutal killings of
thousands by Red Guards without any pretense of due process. In
1979, a detailed criminal code and a code of criminal procedure finally
replaced police administrative rules and vague statutes on "counter-
revolution" that once served to justify death sentences. Formal legal
institutions were revived, and development of the rule of law was
hailed as an urgent task of modernization.
The massacre in Beijing, however, marked a turning point in
China's path toward legal reform and modernization. Not only did
the massive use of lethal force that evening demonstrate the leaders'
willingness to employ the full repressive apparatus of the military to
serve their needs, but it also revealed the intensity of their determina-
tion to quash any threats to their power. Their resort to execution
against political opponents in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Massa-
cre indicates that they still regard the legal system as a tool with which
to consolidate and ensure control. As long as the present hard-line
leadership is determined to hold on to its power, it seems unlikely that
the spirit of legal reform cultivated over the past decade has the
strength and support that will be necessary to build a system of justice
that is more systematic, regularized, and humane.
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